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THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN OF 2008 AND 
THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERVENTION:  
MUCH NEEDED RELIEF OR MAJOR 
EROSION OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
LAW? 
THE CONTINUING STORY OF BANK OF 







The year 2008 found the American public following two 
dramatically different news stories: the divisive, yet exciting, 
presidential campaign and that of the struggling American 
economy.  Housing prices were plummeting, leading to a 
meltdown in the sub-prime mortgage lending arena, Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and the government found itself 
watching several other American institutions on the verge of 
collapsing.  Instead of allowing the economy to recover on its 
own, the government stepped in and attempted to revive many 
corporations, and in turn, the economy, on a much grander scale 
than what the American people generally expect of their 
 
∗ This Article addresses the events and legal implications that were present at 
the time of publication. It likely will take several years for these issues to be 
resolved in their entirety. 
† Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Geoffrey H. Palmer Center for 
Entrepreneurship and the Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; LL.M, 1979, 
New York University School of Law; J.D., 1978, Pepperdine University School of 
Law; B.A., 1975, Pepperdine University. The author has published extensively in the 
areas of corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, and securities 
regulation, and additionally serves on the boards of directors of several publicly 
traded companies. Elizabeth Throne, a Pepperdine law student, provided research 
and invaluable commentary and insight. Without her help, this Article could not 
have been completed. Laurie Henderson and Lacey Osborn, also Pepperdine law 
students, provided editorial comments for this Article. 
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government.1  One way in which the government began this 
attempted revival was through the passage of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (the “Act”), which was signed 
into law on October 3, 2008.2  The Act was created to help 
stabilize the American financial system and prevent further 
damage—a goal it sought to accomplish through the creation of 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), among other 
measures.3
 
1 The United States is typically assumed to “celebrate[ ] laissez-faire capitalism 
as the economic ideal,” but the nation has often drifted from that principle by buying 
interests in railways, coal mines, and steel mills when necessary. Steve Lohr, Bold 
Action with Basis in History, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A1. One period of history 
in which the American government significantly intervened was during the Great 
Depression, which began with the stock market crash of 1929. See generally 
HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492–PRESENT 386–87 
(Harper Perennial Modern Classics reprint 2005) (2001) (describing the stock 
market crash of 1929). During this time, more than five thousand banks shut their 
doors, large numbers of businesses closed, and approximately fifteen million people, 
or one-quarter to one-third of the labor force, were out of work. Id. at 387. In order to 
alleviate the situation, the government created many programs, including the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation started by President Hoover. DAVID M. 
KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 
1929–1945, at 84 (2005). Often described as “bank relief,” Congress capitalized the 
program at $500 million and authorized it to borrow up to an additional $1.5 billion. 
Id. The program provided “emergency loans to banks, building-and-loan societies, 
railroads, and agricultural stabilization corporations.” Id. The government also 
intervened in the economy through a variety of programs known as the “New Deal,” 
which collectively either created entities that provided jobs for Americans or 
increased the regulatory power of the American government, or both. See generally 
id. at 364–80 (discussing generally the variety of programs created under the New 
Deal, including the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board). 
  Through TARP, the government ultimately lent up to 
$700 billion to many financial institutions in the hopes of saving 
2 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765. 
3 See id. § 101. The official purposes of the Act are as follows: 
(1) to immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the 
Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of 
the United States; and (2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities 
are used in a manner that—(A) protects home values, college funds, 
retirement accounts, and life savings; (B) preserves homeownership and 
promotes jobs and economic growth; (C) maximizes overall returns to the 
taxpayers of the United States; and (D) provides public accountability for 
the exercise of such authority. 
Id. § 2, 122 Stat. at 3766 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5201 (West 2011)). The Act also 
included the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 in division B, and the 
Tax Extenders and the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 
2008 in division C. Id. div. B–C, 122 Stat. at 3807–933 (codified in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C.). 
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them from collapse.4  The government gave billions more to other 
corporations in the form of mortgage-backed security purchases, 
direct investments, loan guarantees, and loans, totaling over 
$1.33 trillion.5  The government then became a creditor of many 
major corporations, as well as a majority or controlling 
shareholder in some situations.6  A year after the crisis started 
and on the anniversary of Lehman Brothers’ collapse, President 
Barack Obama addressed Wall Street bankers, advising them to 
“embrace serious financial reform, not fight it.”7
In the case of Bank of America, the government simply 
loaned money, first through TARP to help it survive, and later 
lent more to help it buy another failing financial institution, 
Merrill Lynch.
 
8  In September 2008, Bank of America agreed to 
purchase Merrill Lynch, and the shareholders approved the 
transaction on December 5, 2008.9  In agreeing to the transaction 
and in persuading shareholders to approve it, Bank of America’s 
board of directors relied on representations made in September 
2008 as to Merrill Lynch’s financial condition.10
 
4 Django Gold, Uncle Sam in the Boardroom, DIRECTORSHIP, Feb. 5, 2009, at 23, 
available at http://www.directorship.com/uncle-sam-in-the-boardroom/. The TARP 
program provided loans to, among others, Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, Citigroup, 
AIG, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, GM, Morgan Stanley, 
Goldman Sachs, and Chrysler. Id. at 25. 
  However, in 
5 Id. In addition to TARP funds, the government provided debt and mortgage-
backed security purchases to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, direct investment and 
loan guarantees to Citigroup, and $30 billion to JPMorgan Chase for the Bear 
Stearns acquisition. Id. 
6 The United States government became a creditor of Bank of America, a 
majority shareholder of General Motors, and an owner of thirty-four percent of 
Citigroup, which as described in the article, arguably makes Citigroup a controlling 
shareholder. See Dan Fitzpatrick et al., U.S.A. Inc.: In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played 
Hardball, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played 
Hardball]; John D. Stoll & Neil King, Jr., GM Set To Exit Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., 
July 10, 2009, at A1; David Ellis, It’s Official: You Own a Piece of Citi, 
CNNMONEY.COM (July 30, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/30/news/companies/ 
citigroup_stake/index.htm?section=money_latest. 
7 Elizabeth Williamson & Damian Paletta, Obama Urges Bankers To Back 
Financial Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at A4 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Lehman Brothers Holdings filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 
September 2008 after the United States government declined to help potential 
buyers—including Barclays PLC and Bank of America—finance the purchase of the 
struggling company. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman 
Totters, Merrill Is Sold, AIG Seeks To Raise Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at A1. 
8 See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6. 
9 See id. The agreement was previously approved by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve. See id. 
10 See id. 
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mid-December 2008, Bank of America’s board of directors learned 
that Merrill Lynch’s financial condition was not as it was 
represented to them in September 2008.11  In fact, it was 
significantly worse.12  Nevertheless, Bank of America went 
forward with the transaction, allegedly under pressure from 
government officials to complete the transaction and not disclose 
the information concerning Merrill Lynch’s financial condition to 
shareholders.13  Alleging that such omissions were material, the 
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filed suit against Bank 
of America and began investigating why Bank of America did not 
disclose Merrill Lynch’s deteriorating financial condition 
sooner.14  While Judge Jed Rakoff dismissed the first settlement 
proposed by the parties because it unfairly punished the 
shareholders,15 he eventually—albeit reluctantly—approved a 
$150 million settlement in January 2010.16  Indeed, Judge Rakoff 
harshly criticized the settlement and chastised the bank for 
“hiding material information from its shareholders,” claiming 
that the actions of Bank of America amounted to “fraud.”17  
Furthermore, although the SEC refused to file a suit against any 
individual executives, the settlement approval did not thwart a 
similar suit from New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, 
who charged the bank and two top executives with civil securities 
fraud.18
 
11 See id. 
  While many conflicting accounts exist, this transaction 
between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch raises important 
legal questions regarding the government’s interaction with and 
influence over the private sector.  Saving a corporation or 
multiple corporations from failure is certainly commendable, 
especially when these efforts may significantly help the overall 
American economy.  However, is it legal, or at the very least good 
corporate governance, for boards of directors to yield to 
12 See id. By mid-December, Merrill Lynch had lost almost $21 billion on a 
pretax basis, which constituted approximately $15 billion in net losses. Id. Merrill 
Lynch’s fourth quarter losses amounted to $15.31 billion according to the figure 
announced to Bank of America shareholders on January 16, 2009. Id. 
13 See id.; infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
14 See Dan Fitzpatrick & Kara Scannell, BofA Hit by Fine over Merrill, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 4, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter BofA Hit by Fine over Merrill]. 
15 Dan Fitzpatrick et al., Rakoff Backs BofA Accord, Unhappily, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 23, 2010, at C1 [hereinafter Rakoff Backs BofA Accord]. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
18 See id. 
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governmental pressure and consider the welfare of the overall 
American economy, which arguably equates to considering the 
American public at large, when making such decisions? 
In addition to becoming a creditor, the government also 
became either a majority or a controlling shareholder in several 
other American corporations, most notably General Motors and 
Citigroup.19  In the case of General Motors, the government 
became a sixty percent owner20 after the corporation emerged 
from one of the largest industrial bankruptcies in history.21  Like 
Bank of America, Citigroup initially received funding from the 
government through the TARP program22 and then later 
converted the government’s preferred shares to common shares, 
thus leaving the government with a thirty-four percent stake in 
the corporation.23  While the government claims that it is a 
“reluctant shareholder,”24 boards have started to consider the 
government as a “new addition to their board . . . as activist 
investor, lawmaker, and regulator.”25  Indeed, when the 
government owns a significant stake in corporations and also has 
the dual role as a governmental regulator, how and when does it 
cross the line from only serving as a traditional shareholder?26
 
19 The government also became a majority shareholder in AIG, but this Article 
will only discuss the government’s involvement with General Motors and Citigroup 
due to specific differences between the government’s ownership of AIG and its 
involvement in General Motors and Citigroup. 
 
20 John D. Stoll & Kevin Helliker, Board Debut for GM’s New Chairman, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 3, 2009, at B1. Other sources have stated that the U.S. government owns 
60.8% of General Motors. Peter Whoriskey, GM Emerges from Bankruptcy After 
Landmark Government Bailout, WASH. POST (July 10, 2009), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/10/AR2009071001473.html. 
21 Neil King, Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, WALL 
ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A1. 
22 Gold, supra note 4, at 25. 
23 Ellis, supra note 6. See infra Part I.C for further details regarding the 
conversion of Citigroup’s preferred shares to common shares. 
24 Neil King, Jr. & Sharon Terlep, supra note 21; see also Fact Sheet on Obama 
Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative for General Motors, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-on-Obama-Administration-
Auto-Restructuring-Initiative-for-General-Motors/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2011). 
25 Gold, supra note 4, at 26. 
26 Shareholders are traditionally considered to be the owners of a corporation, 
and they elect directors to manage the corporation and to achieve the goal of 
maximizing their profits. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the 
Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 437 (2006). Shareholders are sometimes 
considered the “underpinning of corporate governance” and theoretically can vote 
directors out of their positions or sell the shares they own in the corporation to voice 
their dissatisfaction. Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable 
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 For example, when the government begins acting as a 
creditor, shareholder, regulator, and stakeholder,27 many of the 
established lines in corporate law blur, and significant questions 
emerge as a result of such government intervention.  Specifically, 
if the government is a creditor, how much is it allowed to 
influence the board of directors?  What happens when the 
government is a majority or controlling shareholder, and its 
conduct breaches the fiduciary duty it owes to minority 
shareholders?  Can boards of directors begin viewing the United 
States economy, or the American public, as a stakeholder, in 
addition to the “traditional” stakeholders such as employees and 
the community?28
This Article explores these questions and more with respect 
to the current role the government is playing in three 
corporations—Bank of America, General Motors, and Citigroup—
and the relevant issues raised within corporate law.  Specifically, 
this Article discusses whether boards of directors may have acted 
in such a way that potentially breaches traditional fiduciary 
duties—duties of due care, loyalty, and good faith—and whether 
the business judgment rule still protects these boards when they 
were pressured by the government.  Furthermore, this Article 
also explores whether there were violations under Rule 10b-5 of 




Impact of Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 349 (2009). There 
are two typical types of shareholders: (1) the individual shareholder, who, because 
he or she is one of many, is often apathetic regarding participating in governing the 
corporation; and (2) institutional shareholders. See id. at 349–50. Institutional 
shareholders often have the ability to monitor corporations and become involved in 
corporate governance. Id. at 350. The stereotypical institutional investors include 
(1) pension funds; (2) mutual funds; (3) insurance companies; (4) foundations; 
(5) university and charitable endowments; (6) banks investing trust funds; 
(7) brokerage firms; and (8) investment vehicles for sophisticated investors. ROBERT 
W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING 
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 520 (11th ed. 2010). The 
government, as neither an individual nor a group of investors, does not fit into either 
category of “normal” shareholders. 
 the duty of candor 
required in Delaware, and the duty of fairness.  This Article also 
27 “Stakeholder” has many definitions, but the term is typically considered to 
include the “employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, [and] communit[y]” of a 
corporation. Wai Shun Wilson Leung, Note, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: 
A Proposed Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 622 (1997). Neither the American economy, nor the 
American public, has ever been considered a stakeholder. 
28 See id. 
29 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (West 2011). 
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analyzes the duties the government owes fellow shareholders 
when it acts as either a majority or controlling shareholder and 
addresses the idea that the U.S. government may be beginning to 
engage in what many foreign governments already utilize, the 
golden share.  Part I discusses the financial crisis of 2008 with 
respect to Bank of America, General Motors, and Citigroup.  Part 
II summarizes the traditional triad of fiduciary duties owed by, 
and legal protections provided to, boards of directors under 
common law.  Part III details the fiduciary duties owed by 
directors to shareholders under the duty of candor in Delaware.  
Part IV discusses additional relevant laws and issues, including 
Rule 10b-5, the duty of directors to be fair to all shareholders, 
and the duty of loyalty owed by majority and controlling 
shareholders to minority shareholders.  Part V analyzes all the 
legal implications of the financial crisis of 2008 with respect to 
the three profiled companies.   
I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008: THE BACKGROUND TO 
DISCUSSING THE GOVERNMENT’S EROSION OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE LAW 
The various legal doctrines and laws briefly discussed above 
all became very relevant in late 2008 when the American 
economy began to crumble.  Suddenly, major corporations were 
either failing or only surviving after receiving significant 
financial assistance from the government.  Through the Act, 
which was signed into law on October 3, 2008, the government 
created TARP to help stabilize the economy.30  Two programs of 
the Act, the Capital Purchase Program and the Capital 
Assistance Program, were specifically designed to assist banks by 
providing capital.31
 
30 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3765. 
  While many major financial institutions and 
31 The Capital Purchase Program is a voluntary program in which the Treasury 
Department provides capital to healthy financial institutions that want additional 
capital to ensure stability. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury 
Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1207.aspx. The 
program provides additional capital by purchasing banks’ preferred shares on 
standardized terms, including warrants for future Treasury Department purchases 
of common stock. Id. In return, the financial institutions must pay the Treasury 
Department a five percent dividend on senior preferred shares for the first five years 
after the investment and nine percent per year thereafter. Id. Two-hundred fifty 
billion dollars were allotted to the program. Id. The application period to receive 
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corporations were impacted, three in particular became 
significantly involved with the government: Bank of America, 
General Motors, and Citigroup.32
A. Bank of America and the Shareholders It Left in the Dark
 
33
Bank of America initially received $15 billion from TARP as 
part of the Capital Purchase Program in fall 2008.
 
34  Later, Bank 
of America CEO and Chairman Ken Lewis stated that this 
investment had a “dilutive effect” on existing shareholders and 
was not requested by Bank of America, but was instead taken at 
the request of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and others.35
 
funding under the Capital Purchase Program ended in late 2008 and early 2009 with 
due dates varying based on the different types of companies. Capital Purchase 
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/investment-programs/cpp/Pages/capitalpurchaseprogram.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2011). The Capital Assistance Program, which the Treasury Department 
announced on February 25, 2009, has two objectives: (1) to analyze whether any of 
the major American banks need to establish additional capital as a buffer during the 
financial crisis; and (2) to provide common equity as a “bridge to private capital in 
the future” to qualifying financial institutions. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
TREASURY WHITE PAPER, THE CAPITAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND ITS ROLE IN THE 
FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN 2 (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/tg40_capwhitepaper.pdf. Additionally, the Automotive Industry 
Financing Program, which was also created under TARP, has provided $76 billion in 
loans or equity investments to General Motors, GMAC, Chrysler Holding, and 
Chrysler Financial, in order to avoid “disorderly bankruptcy.” Automotive Industry 
Financing Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Pages/autoprogram.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2011). 
  
32 Hundreds of financial institutions and other corporations have been involved 
in the programs. For a complete list of which institutions have received funding, how 
much funding, what the government received, and who has repaid the government, 
see Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
financial-stability/briefing-room/reports/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 
2011). 
33 At the time of writing, the current events surrounding Bank of America were 
still rapidly evolving. 
34 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
TRANSACTIONS REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING JANUARY 12, 2011, CAPITAL PURCHASE 
PROGRAM 1 (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/briefing-room/reports/tarp-transactions/DocumentsTARPTransactions/11-
18-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2011-16-10.pdf [hereinafter 
TRANSACTIONS REPORT, CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM]. 
35 Editorial, Busting Bank of America, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2009, at A14 
(internal quotation marks omitted). While Lewis did not explain what he meant by 
“dilutive effect,” he possibly was referring to the fact that the government received 
preferred stock with warrants by injecting capital into Bank of America, thus 
diminishing the power of other preferred shareholders. See generally Press Release, 
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Then, Bank of America received additional funds to help finance 
Bank of America’s purchase of Merrill Lynch.  The total amount 
the United States provided to the corporation to reach $45 
billion.36  The $45 billion was eventually returned to the 
government a year later, on December 9, 2009.37  While Bank of 
America’s shareholders were aware of the $15 billion received in 
TARP funds, they were not aware of the additional financing 
provided by the government and the terrible financial condition 
of Merrill Lynch until Bank of America notified shareholders and 
the public in January 2009.38
To provide a timeline of significant events regarding the 
merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, on September 15, 
2008, after less than forty-eight hours of due diligence,
 
39 Bank of 
America entered into an agreement to purchase Merrill Lynch to 
ultimately save the company from collapse.40  This agreement 
was approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
on November 26, 2008, and on December 5, 2008, the 
shareholders of both Merrill Lynch and Bank of America 
approved the transaction.41  However, by mid-December, Merrill 
Lynch’s finances were not what they were when Bank of America 
had agreed to purchase the company.42
 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program 
Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www. treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp1207.aspx (describing the Capital Purchase Program). 
  In fact, the substantial 
losses, some of which remained undisclosed to shareholders even 
though they had become known to Bank of America executives 
36 Eric Dash et al., Bank of America to Receive $20 Billion More, NY TIMES, Jan. 
16, 2009, at B1. 
37 David Mildenberg, Bank of America Names Moynihan CEO, Replacing Lewis, 
BUS. WK. (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/ 
dec2009/ db20091216_513214.htm?chan=rss_topStories_ssi_5. 
38 See Busting Bank of America, supra note 35. 
39 In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6; see also Letter from 
Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney Gen., New York, to Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, 
U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs 1 (Apr. 23, 2009) 
[hereinafter Cuomo Letter], available at http://www.marketwatch.com/ story/text-
cuomo-letter-merrill-lynch (“Time was of the essence for Merrill Lynch, as the 
company was not likely to survive the following week without a merger.”). 
40 See Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn into a 
Federal Bailout? Part III: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Government Reform, 111th Cong. 23–24 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of 
Henry M. Paulson, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury). 
41 Id. at 22. 
42 In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6. 
CP_Kerr (Do Not Delete)  7/14/2011  4:17 PM 
58 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:49   
prior to the shareholder vote,43 amounted to $13.3 billion in 
pretax losses for the preceding two months alone.44  On December 
17, 2008, Lewis flew to Washington to inform federal regulators 
that he was considering invoking the material adverse change 
(“MAC”) clause to rescind the merger agreement,45 which was a 
legal course of action.46  According to Lewis, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke and Paulson pressured Lewis to 
continue with the merger agreement but to not inform 
shareholders of the newly-discovered details regarding Merrill 
Lynch’s financial losses.47  Government officials warned Lewis 
that backing out of the transaction would upset the markets, 
ignite lawsuits against Bank of America, and hurt the bank’s 
reputation.48  Furthermore, government officials told Lewis that 
future requests for government assistance would lead officials to 
contemplate having more control over Bank of America’s 
operations.49  Most importantly, Lewis stated that Paulson 
advised him that the government would remove Bank of 
America’s board and management if the bank invoked the MAC 
clause and backed out of the merger.50
 
43 Cuomo Letter, supra note 39, at 2. Bank of America’s CFO, Joseph Price, 
informed Lewis that “Merrill Lynch’s financial condition had seriously deteriorated 
at an alarming rate.” Id. 
 
44 In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6. 
45 A “[m]aterial [a]dverse [e]ffect” or “material adverse change” is “any material 
adverse change or effect on the business, condition (financial or otherwise), assets, 
results of operations or prospects of the [c]ompany and its [s]ubsidiaries, taken as 
whole.” John D. Amorosi, Significant Topics in Private Equity, in TENTH ANNUAL 
PRIVATE EQUITY FORUM 2009, at 161, 166 (PLI Corp. Law Practice Course 
Handbook Series No. 18,819, 2009). Most merger agreements have MAC clauses, 
which allow a party to walk away from a transaction without suffering consequences 
if the other party to the transaction has incurred a MAC. Robert T. Miller, The 
Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses in Business 
Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2007 (2009). 
46 See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6 (“Bank of America 
had a legal basis to abandon the deal.”). But see Hearing, supra note 40, at 5 
(statement of Henry M. Paulson, U.S. Secretary of Treasury) (“I was expressing 
what I am confident was the strong opinion of the Federal Reserve, namely, that 
exercise of the MAC clause was not a legally viable option.”). 
47 See Liz Rappaport, Lewis Testifies U.S. Urged Silence on Deal, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 23, 2009, at A1. If Bank of America’s shareholders had been informed of Merrill 
Lynch’s losses, they potentially could have stopped the purchase and instead allowed 
Merrill Lynch to fail. Id. 
48 See id. 
49 See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6. 
50 Rappaport, supra note 47. Lewis testified:  
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On December 22, 2008, Lewis met with the board of directors 
to inform them of his decision not to invoke the MAC clause.51
(1) [F]irst and foremost, the Treasury and [Federal Reserve] are 
unified in their view that the failure of [Bank of America] to 
complete the acquisition of Merrill Lynch would result in 
systemic risk to the financial services system in America and 
would have adverse consequences for [Bank of America]; 
(2) second, the Treasury and [Federal Reserve] stated strongly 
that were [Bank of America] to invoke the [MAC] clause in the 
merger agreement with Merrill Lynch and fail to close the 
transaction, the Treasury and [Federal Reserve] would remove 
the Board and management of the Corporation . . . .
  
According to the minutes of that meeting, Lewis listed the key 
points of his discussions with Paulson and Bernanke: 
52
The board held another meeting on December 30, 2008, where 
Lewis revealed the government’s influence over the bank: 
 
[W]ere it not for the serious concerns regarding the status of the 
United States financial services system and the adverse 
consequences of that situation to [Bank of America] articulated 
by the federal regulators . . . [Bank of America] would, in light 
of the deterioration of the operating results and capital position 
of Merrill Lynch, assert the [MAC] clause in its merger 
agreement with Merrill Lynch and would seek to renegotiate 
the transaction.53
Although Bank of America’s board clearly recognized the 
gravity of Merrill Lynch’s financial situation, the company did 
not disclose Merrill Lynch’s significant losses or its impact on the 
 
 
I can’t recall if [Paulson] said, “We would remove the board and 
management if you called it [off]” or if he said “we would do it if you 
intended to.” I don’t remember which one it was . . . . I said “Hank, let’s 
deescalate this for a while. Let me talk to our board.”  
Id. (second alteration in original). Moreover, Paulson later stated that he made this 
threat regarding the board’s removal at the request of Bernanke. Cuomo Letter, 
supra note 39, at 3. As Bank of America’s primary regulator, the government has the 
authority to remove executives when it concludes that they are “behaving 
irresponsibly.” In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6. 
51 Cuomo Letter, supra note 39, at 3. 
52 Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America 
Corporation 2, Dec. 22, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/ 
documents/ExhibitB-cuomo04232009.pdf (exhibit B to Cuomo Letter, supra note 39). 
53 Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America 
Corporation 2, Dec. 30, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/ 
documents/ExhibitC-cuomo04232009.pdf (exhibit C to Cuomo Letter, supra note 39). 
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merger.54  Nevertheless, the final details of Bank of America’s 
purchase of Merrill Lynch were completed on January 1, 2009.55  
On January 20, 2009, Bank of America announced that it 
planned to accept $20 billion in TARP funds from the 
government and that Merrill Lynch had lost $15.3 billion in the 
fourth quarter of 2008.56  Shareholders were furious with Bank of 
America’s lack of disclosure regarding Merrill Lynch’s financial 
condition, as evidenced by threats of large institutional investors, 
such as TIAA-CREF57 and CalPERS,58 to vote against Lewis’s re-
election as Chairman of the board.59  Consequently, on April 29, 
2009, Lewis was removed as Chairman of Bank of America, 
although he remained the CEO and still served on the board of 
directors.60
 
54 Cuomo Letter, supra note 39, at 4. 
 
55 Rappaport, supra note 47. 
56 See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6; Rappaport, supra 
note 47. The minutes of the board meeting held on December 30, 2008 illustrate that 
Bank of America was attempting to “time its disclosure of Merrill Lynch’s losses to 
coincide with the announcement of” the bank’s January earnings and its additional 
receipt of TARP funds. Cuomo Letter, supra note 39, at 4. 
57 TIAA-CREF is a financial services company that provides retirement 
assistance to those working in the “academic, research, medical, and cultural fields.” 
Overview, TIA-CREF, http://www.tiaa-cref.org/about/press/about_us/facts.html (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2011). As of September 30, 2010, TIAA-CREF managed more than 
$434 billion in assets and served more than 3.7 million people. Id. 
58 CalPERS, or the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, provides 
“retirement, health, and related financial programs and benefits to more than 1.6 
million public employees, retirees, and their families and more than 3,000 public 
employers” in California. CALPERS, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/ (last visited Mar. 19, 
2011). The institution owns 22.7 million shares of Bank of America. See Tom 
Petruno, CalPERS Joins Efforts To Oust BofA Board, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at 
B2. 
59 Petruno, supra note 58. CalPERS said that it would vote against the 
reelection of all eighteen directors. Id. In regard to Bank of America’s failure to 
disclose information to shareholders about its purchase of Merrill Lynch, the 
CalPERS board president Rob Feckner stated, “[t]he entire board failed in its duties 
to shareowners and should be removed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Additionally, many proxy-advisory firms, including Egan-Jones, advised 
shareholders to not vote for Lewis, as well as other directors. See Press Release, 
Egan-Jones Proxy Service, Egan-Jones Issues Statement on Bank of America (Apr. 
24, 2009), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory& 
refer=conews&tkr=MER:US&sid=aZ7gMpmiDzxo. 
60 Changing Course, ECONOMIST, May. 2, 2009, at 73. Walter Massey, a veteran 
of Bank of America’s board of directors, replaced Lewis as chairman. Id. In 2008, a 
proposal to split the chairman and CEO positions was approved by thirty-six percent 
of stockholders’ votes because they wanted to promote the board’s independence. See 
Jonathan Stempel & Martha Graybow, BofA Investor Sees Chariman/CEO Job 
Split, REUTERS, Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousivMolt/ 
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In February 2009, Lewis testified under oath before New 
York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, stating that Paulson and 
Bernanke instructed him to remain silent about the financial 
situation of Merrill Lynch leading up to the merger.61  While not 
explicitly told to withhold information from shareholders, Lewis 
testified that he believed the government wanted him to remain 
silent, as he was instructed that “[w]e do not want a public 
disclosure.”62  In fact, when Lewis asked Bernanke to put 
something down in writing, Lewis stated that Paulson 
responded, “this would be a disclosable event and we do not want 
a disclosable event.”63  As a result of this exchange, nothing was 
written down about the December negotiations between Lewis 
and the government.64  Moreover, Lewis has acknowledged that 
he believed Paulson was asking Bank of America’s shareholders 
to take some of Merrill Lynch’s losses in order to avoid 
widespread financial disaster.65
 
idUSTRE53F5K120090416. The proposal was submitted again in 2009 and passed 
with 50.34% supporting it and 49.66% not supporting it. Ieva M. Augstums & Mitch 
Weiss, Ken Lewis Ousted as Bank of America Chairman, HUFFINGTON POST  
(Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/29/bank-of-america-
sharehold_n_192838.html. 
  Essentially, Lewis was stating 
61 ‘It Wasn’t Up to Me’: Excerpts from Ken Lewis’s Testimony, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
23, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124050112892948367.html [hereinafter It 
Wasn’t Up to Me]. 
62 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
63 Id. By “disclosable event,” Lewis was likely trying to say that Paulson was 
referring to “material” information, which the bank would have been required to 
disclose. In Delaware, for information to be “material,” there must be a “substantial 
likelihood” that the nonpublic information would have been a significant factor when 
deciding whether to “buy, sell, vote, or tender stock.” In re Oracle Corp., 867 A.2d 
904, 934 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 960 (Del. 2005) (citing Rosenblatt v. Getty 
Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985)). On the federal level, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has a similar standard of disclosure for material 
information. In certain situations, boards of directors must disclose material 
information to stockholders. One example is Form 8-K, which the SEC requires a 
corporation to file when announcing “major events that the shareholders should 
know about.” Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). This 
requirement is trigged in a variety of circumstances, including entry into or 
termination of a material definitive agreement, material impairments of financial 
information, and any other event that is not called for by Form 8-K but that the 
corporation considers important to security holders. See id. 
64 It Wasn’t Up to Me, supra note 61. 
65 See id. In response to the question, “Wasn’t Mr. Paulson, by his instruction, 
really asking Bank of America shareholders to take a good part of the hit of Merrill 
losses?,” Lewis responded, “What [Paulson] was doing was trying to stem financial 
disaster in the financial markets from his perspective.” Id. 
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that Paulson and Bernanke forced the entire merger on him and 
the board. 
Curiously, after Lewis testified before Cuomo in February, 
he, Bernanke, and Paulson testified in the summer of 2009 in 
front of the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform with Mr. Lewis providing conflicting stories of what 
happened during the final months of 2008.66  First, Lewis backed 
off on what he initially testified to Cuomo.67  Instead, Lewis 
stated that “[he] would say they strongly advised and they spoke 
in strong terms, but [that] it was with the best intentions.”68  
Lewis continued by stating that Bernanke “never said we should 
not disclose something that should be disclosed.”69  Bernanke 
later denied that he threatened Lewis with taking his job if he 
did not follow through with the purchase.70  Paulson, on the other 
hand, defended the government’s actions and stated that he 
warned Lewis that Bank of America’s management could be 
replaced if they backed out of the transaction.71
Since the fallout from the Merrill Lynch purchase, major 
shake-ups in management and the board of directors have 
occurred at Bank of America.  In addition to Lewis being voted 
out as Chairman in spring 2009, on June 5, 2009, it was 
announced that the Chief Risk Officer for Bank of America, Amy 
Woods Brinkley, as well as director Robert Tillman, would be 
leaving the company in the midst of a United States-mandated 
 
 
66 See Michael R. Crittenden & Dan Fitzpatrick, Lewis Takes Heat but Defends 
Merrill Deal, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2009, at C1. 
67 See id. 
68 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
69 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). He also testified: 
Bank of America concluded that there were serious risks to declaring a 
material adverse change, and that proceeding with the transaction, with 
governmental support, was the better course . . . . [It] made sense for the 
stability of the markets. 
. . . . 
I believe that committed people of good intentions . . . worked desperately 
hard in late 2008 to prevent a collapse of the global financial system that 
would have resonated throughout the global economy. 
Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn into a Federal 
Bailout? Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform and Subcomm. 
on Domestic Policy, 111th Cong. 24–25 (2009) (statement of Kenneth D. Lewis, Chief 
Executive Officer, Bank of America). 
70 See Michael R. Crittenden & Jon Hilsenrath, Bernanke Blasted in House, 
WALL ST. J., June 26, 2009, at A1. 
71 See Michael R. Crittenden, Paulson Lambasted for Crisis, WALL ST. J., July 
17, 2009, at C1. 
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review.72  Additionally, on that same day, four outside directors 
were appointed to the board of Bank of America.73  These 
directors were selected as a result of “strong suggestions” from 
federal regulators that Bank of America improve its corporate 
governance.74  Furthermore, on September 30, 2009, Lewis 
announced that he was resigning from his position as CEO of 
Bank of America, effective at the end of 2009.75  Lewis stated that 
it was his decision to resign, and according to a company 
spokesperson, he did not decide to resign due to government 
pressure.76  Shortly thereafter, Lewis agreed to return the $1 
million in salary he had received for the year and not to accept 
the additional $1.5 million he was to receive for the rest of the 
year.77  Bank of America said that Lewis voluntarily chose to 
forgo his 2009 pay, but it was at the suggestion of the pay czar, 
who felt that Lewis’s compensation package of $69.3 million was 
sufficient.78  A Bank of America spokesperson stated, “Mr. 
Lewis . . . felt it was not in the best interest of Bank of America 
for him to get involved in a dispute with the paymaster.”79
 
72 Dan Fitzpatrick & Michael R. Crittenden, BofA’s Risk Officer Leaving Amid 
Review, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009, at C3. Brinkley, 53, had been at the company 
since 1978 and once was considered a possible successor to Lewis. Id. The 
spokesman for Bank of America stated her leave was “a management decision” and 
that Lewis and Brinkley “mutually agreed that a change be made to better deal with 
the credit environment as it is evolving.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 




73 Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, BofA Gets New Blood for Board, WALL ST. 
J., June 6, 2009, at B1. 
74 Id. Two of the new board members have ties to the government: Susan Bies is 
a former Federal Reserve Governor and Donald Powell is a former FDIC Chairman. 
Id. 
75 See Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, Bank of America Chief Resigns Under 
Fire, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2009, at A1. 
76 See id. Lewis wrote to employees, “I will simply say that this was my decision, 
and mine alone.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77 Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Czar Blocks BofA Chief’s Pay, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 16, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Czar Blocks BofA Chief’s Pay]. However, Lewis 
did keep his pension fund, worth $53 million and consisting of $3.5 million a year in 
payouts, for the rest of his life. Colin Barr, BofA CEO: $53 Million Retirement Score, 
CNNMONEY.COM (Oct. 1, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/01/news/newsmakers/ 
lewis.payout.fortune/index.htm. 
78 See Czar Blocks BofA Chief’s Pay, supra note 77. The pay czar, Kenneth 
Feinberg, is the United States Treasury Department’s  “special master” regarding 
compensation. Id. 
79 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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December 2009, Brian T. Moynihan, then in charge of the 
consumer banking division of Bank of America, was named the 
new CEO of the company.80
Furthermore, on July 16, 2009, The Wall Street Journal 
reported that Bank of America was operating under a secret 
memorandum of understanding (“MOU”),
 
81 which was imposed in 
May by the government.82  The agreement required Bank of 
America to “overhaul its board” and tackle problems associated 
with risk and liquidity management.83
By the end of summer 2009, Bank of America began to 
experience legal trouble, in addition to strong criticism from the 
press and public, regarding its acquisition of Merrill Lynch and 
its lack of disclosures to shareholders.  First, the SEC alleged 
that proxy documents sent to Bank of America’s shareholders at 
the end of 2008 stated that Merrill Lynch would not pay year-end 
bonuses or compensation before the purchase was finalized 
without permission from Bank of America.
 
84  However, Merrill 
Lynch employees received $3.6 billion in bonuses shortly before 
Bank of America officially purchased the company.85
 
80 Mildenberg, supra note 37. 
  Due to the 
size of the bonuses and the poor financial health of Merrill 
Lynch, the SEC alleged this omission was material and that 
81 An MOU is the most common informal enforcement proceeding federal 
regulators implement against banks. James M. Rockett, Confronting a Regulatory 
Crisis: A View from the Trenches During Troubled Times, 126 BANKING L.J. 307, 311 
(2009). Regulators use this document to inform banks of corrective actions they must 
take within a specified time period. Id. An MOU is used when the weakness 
regulators see within the institution is not considered to be an immediate threat to 
the bank’s health. Id. It is not a public document, and thus the general public cannot 
review its terms on the bank’s or regulatory institution’s websites. Id. Accordingly, 
the nonpublic MOU has been called the “weakest type of enforcement action.” 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 
39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1619 (2007). In the past, regulators chose to issue them 
because they feared public disclosure of a bank with an MOU would result in a 
“ ‘crisis of [public] confidence’ in the banking system.” Id. (alteration in original); see 
also Paul L. Lee, Risk Management and the Role of the Board of Directors: 
Regulatory Expectations and Shareholder Actions, 125 BANKING L.J. 679, 695–96 
(2008). 
82 Dan Fitzpatrick, U.S. Regulators to BofA: Obey or Else, WALL ST. J., July 16, 
2009, at C1 [hereinafter U.S. Regulators to BofA]. An MOU is the “most serious 
procedural action taken against Bank of America by federal regulators since the 
financial crisis erupted.” Id. 
83 Id. 
84 See BofA Hit by Fine over Merrill, supra note 14. 
85 Kara Scannell et al., Judge Tosses out Bonus Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 
2009, at A1. 
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investors should have known about the bonuses at the time of the 
December vote.86  The SEC filed suit, but in August 2009, it was 
announced that Bank of America and the SEC had reached a $33 
million deal to settle the lawsuit, with Bank of America neither 
admitting nor denying any wrongdoing.87  However, in 
September 2009, United States District Court Judge Jed Rakoff 
dismissed the deal, pointing out that it was the shareholders that 
were being asked to pay the fine for the alleged wrongdoing, 
despite also being the victims.88  In January 2010, the SEC 
expanded its lawsuit against Bank of America by filing charges 
against the corporation for withholding information from 
shareholders about Merrill Lynch’s financial losses after they 
approved the merger.89  In February 2010, Judge Rakoff 
unhappily approved a $150 million settlement between the SEC 
and Bank of America.90  Indeed, Judge Rakoff stated that what 
Bank of America did “in effect if not in intent” amounted to “a 
fraud.”91
Moreover, five pension funds have sued Bank of America 
over the allegations that the company withheld Merrill Lynch’s 




86 BofA Hit by Fine over Merrill, supra note 14. 
  
The pension funds are from Ohio, Texas, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands, and had previously filed suits independently of one 
another but later joined their suits at the end of September  
 
87 Id. 
88 See Scannell et al., supra note 85. Judge Rakoff said that imposing the fine, 
which ultimately would hurt shareholders, “does not comport with the most 
elementary notions of justice and morality,” and that if the bank’s executives relied 
on attorneys when creating the proxy statements, “why are the penalties not then 
sought from the lawyers?” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
89 See Zachary A. Goldfarb, Regulator Broadens Charges on Bank of America for 
Crisis Moves, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2010, at A13. 
90 Rakoff Backs BofA Accord, supra note 15. Bank of America agreed to a long 
list of new policies in the agreement, including allowing shareholders a voice on pay 
vote and creating a “super-independence” standard for compensation committee 
members. Kristin Gribben, BofA Agrees to Governance Changes in SEC Settlement, 
AGENDA, Feb. 8, 2010. Judge Rakoff grudgingly accepted the settlement, stating that 
the fine was “paltry,” and “hid[ ] material information from its shareholders.” Rakoff 
Backs BofA Accord, supra note 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). He accused 
the SEC of being “content with modest and misdirected sanctions.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
91 Rakoff Backs BofA Accord, supra note 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
92 Marshall Eckblad, BofA Sued by Funds over Merrill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 
2009, at C3. 
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2009.93  Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray, the lead 
plaintiff in the case, plans to seek damages not only from the 
corporation, but also from individual executives and directors.94
Although the SEC settled its lawsuits against Bank of 
America,
 
95 it declined to file individual charges against the 
individual executives and lawyers who approved the decisions 
concerning the transactions.96  While bank officials were lucky 
not to be charged individually by the SEC, two management 
officials, as well as the bank itself, did indeed face civil charges 
from Cuomo on February 4, 2010.97  In the State of New York 
Cuomo charged Lewis and Price, the finance chief when Bank of 
America bought Merrill Lynch and the current consumer-
banking chief, with misleading investors by not disclosing Merrill 
Lynch’s losses before the shareholders voted affirmatively to buy 
the company.98  Specifically, Cuomo argues that Bank of America 
and its two top management executives, Lewis and Price, 





94 Id. One document filed in March 2009 detailed losses of hundreds of millions 
of dollars; however, the plaintiffs in the case had not formally stated the amount of 
damages they were requesting. See id. 
95 See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
96 See Rakoff Backs BofA Accord, supra note 15. In order to sue individuals for 
fraud, the SEC must prove that such individuals sought to mislead investors. See 
Dan Fitzpatrick & Kara Scannell, Ex-BofA Chief Sued for Fraud, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
5, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Ex-BofA Chief Sued for Fraud]. The SEC has stated that 
it did not find any evidence that “executives deliberately concealed information from 
lawyers or that internal or outside lawyers intentionally sought to mislead 
shareholders.” Id. 
97 See Ex-BofA Chief Sued for Fraud, supra note 96.  
98 See id. Cuomo brought the charges under the Martin Act, a New York law 
that does not require a finding that one acted intentionally in securities fraud. See 
id.; see also N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–53 (McKinney 2010). During a telephone 
press conference, Cuomo stated, “We believe the bank management understated the 
Merrill Lynch losses to shareholders, then they overstated their ability to terminate 
their agreement to secure $20 billion of TARP money, and that is just a fraud.” 
Karen Freifeld & David Scheer, Ken Lewis, Bank of America Sued by Cuomo for 
Fraud over Merrill, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.bloomberg. 
com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=avbhw22ygkMA (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
99 See Press Release, Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney Gen., New York, Attorney 
General Cuomo Files Fraud Charges Against Bank of America, Former CEO 
Kenneth Lewis, and Former CFO Joseph Price (Feb. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2010/feb/ feb04a_10.html. Cuomo’s complaint 
states that “[m]any of the statements made by Lewis and Price in the period from 
the merger’s announcement to its closing were false, misleading, or became so in 
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These events raise questions and invoke dialogue regarding 
the business judgment rule, the duty of candor, Rule 10b-5, and 
golden shares. 
B. General Motors and Its Majority Shareholder, the United 
States Government 
Until 2008, General Motors (“GM”) was the world’s largest 
auto manufacturer, producing over nine million cars and trucks a 
year in thirty-four different countries.100  The company had 463 
subsidiaries and employed 234,500 people—91,000 in America 
alone—paying $476 million in salaries each month.101  Moreover, 
GM provided health care and pension benefits for 493,000 retired 
workers and spent $50 billion each year buying parts and 
services from 11,500 vendors.102  However, the company had not 
made a profit since 2004, and on June 1, 2009, it became one of 
the largest industrial bankruptcies in history.103  In its 
bankruptcy filing, GM declared that it had $172 billion in debt 
with only $82 billion in assets.104  The filing came after President 
Obama, on March 30, 2009, “laid out a framework for [GM] to 
achieve viability that required the [c]ompany to rework its 
business plan, accelerate its operational restructuring and make 
far greater reductions in its outstanding liabilities.”105  After 
approving GM’s plan, the government agreed to provide 
approximately $30 billion, in addition to the $20 billion the 
government had already provided, to support GM’s restructuring 
plan.106
 
light of the events” that occurred over fall 2008. Complaint at 70, New York v. Bank 
of Am. Corp., 2010 WL 430118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010) (No. 4501152010), 
available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2010/feb/BoA_Complaint.pdf. Those 
statements include making misleading statements about due diligence, misleading 
the market, supporting the merger despite growing losses at Merrill Lynch, issuing 
a misleading proxy statement, supporting the merger at the shareholder vote, and 
issuing a press release on January 1, 2009 to announce the merger without 
disclosing all of the events that had occurred over the previous few months. See id. 
at 70–80. 
 
100 A Giant Falls, ECONOMIST, June 6, 2009, at 1. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 King & Terlep, supra note 21. 
104 See A Giant Falls, supra note 100. 
105 Fact Sheet on Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative for 
General Motors, supra note 24. 
106 See id. The government had already put approximately $20 billion into GM 
at the time of the bankruptcy filing, leading the total cost to taxpayers to be around 
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The government wasted no time in reshaping GM’s board of 
directors in the hope of creating the “New G.M.”107  On June 9, 
2009, Edward E. Whitacre Jr., the former Chairman of AT&T, 
was handpicked by the government’s auto task force and named 
the new Chairman of GM.108  Whitacre replaced GM’s longtime 
Chairman and Chief Executive Richard Wagoner, who resigned 
in March 2009 upon the request of President Obama.109  While 
five existing directors remained on the board,110 six other board 
members retired in accordance with the government’s 
restructuring plan.111  To replace these resigned directors, the 
United States government, who has taken a sixty percent stake 
in the company, stated that it would name four more directors to 
serve on the board.112
 
$100 billion. See A Giant Falls, supra note 100, at 3. GM had received the initial 
loan from the government as part of its auto industry bailout. See Stoll & King, 
supra note 6. 
  Furthermore, the Canadian government, 
who would own twelve percent of the company after giving $9 
107 Edward E. Whitacre Jr., N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/ 
reference/timestopics/people/w/edward_e_whitacre_jr/index.html?inline=nyt-per. 
(last updated Aug. 12, 2010). 
108 See Bill Vlasic, G.M. Chairman’s Task: Bring Fresh Perspective, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 10, 2009, at B4. In February 2009, President Obama assembled the auto task 
force to restructure the nation’s auto industry by analyzing the various corporations 
and by making recommendations to auto companies on how to survive. See Neil King 
Jr. & John D. Stoll, Auto Task Force Set To Back More Loans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 
2009, at A1. The head of the team, who has taken a “crash course” with the whole 
team in the workings of the auto industry, reports to the Treasury Secretary and the 
Chief White House Economic Adviser. Id. Known as the Presidential Task Force on 
the Auto Industry, it is comprised of ten cabinet members and other top officials, but 
also includes many senior policy aids. David Shepardson & Gordon Trowbridge, Auto 
Task Force Taking Shape, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 21, 2009, at B1. The appointment of 
Whitacre reflected the President’s top auto advisers’ belief that an outsider was 
needed to lead GM in the right direction. See Edward E. Whitacre Jr., supra note 
107. 
109 See Vlasic, supra note 108; Micheline Maynard, G. Richard Wagoner Jr., N.Y. 
TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/w/g_richard_ 
wagoner_jr/index.html?inline=nyt-per (last updated Mar. 30, 2009). In a statement 
following his resignation, Wagoner stated that he had been “urged to ‘step aside’ ” by 
government officials. Id. 
110 Initially, six existing directors remained on the board. See Vlasic, supra note 
108. However, on December 1, 2009, GM announced that Frederick A. Henderson, 
the company’s CEO, was resigning and would be succeeded by Whitacre. See 
Frederick A. Henderson, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ 
timestopics/people/h/frederick_a_henderson/index.html?inline=nyt-per (last updated 
Dec. 1, 2009). 
111 See Vlasic, supra note 108. 
112 See Stoll & King, supra note 6. 
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billion in aid, would name one director to the board.113  Lastly, 
the United Automobile Workers (“UAW”) health care trust, 
“which own[ed] 17.5% of [the company], ha[d] already named its 
representative to the board.”114  The new government-assembled 
board of directors planned to work with management during the 
end of 2009 to revamp GM’s business strategy for 2010.115  On 
July 10, 2009, GM emerged from bankruptcy after only forty days 
in court and a $50 billion commitment from the government.116
The government has stated that it is a reluctant shareholder 
in GM and would not become overly involved in the 
corporation.
 
117  White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs 
stated, “There obviously is a balancing act . . . .  While not 
running an auto company on a day-to-day basis, obviously there 
will be concern about investments by the taxpayer, as there 
should be.”118
The government has no desire to own equity stakes in 
companies any longer than necessary, and will seek to dispose 
of its ownership interests as soon as practicable. . . . 
  Accordingly, the government has outlined four 
principles that will apply to its equity stake in GM: 
In exceptional cases where the U.S. government feels it is 
necessary to respond to a company’s request for substantial 
assistance, the government will reserve the right to set upfront 
conditions to protect taxpayers, promote financial stability and 
encourage growth. . . . 
 
113 See id. 
114 Id. Bondholders and other creditors will receive the remaining ten percent 
stake in the company. See John Hughes et al., GM Begins Bankruptcy Process with 
Filing for Affiliate, BLOOMBERG.COM (June 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=ahXd19xtoPx0. 
115 See John D. Stoll, GM Board To Help Update Strategy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 
2009, at B1. 
116 See Stoll & King, supra note 6. 
117 See King & Terlep, supra note 21. President Obama emphasized that they 
were “acting as a reluctant shareholder because this is the only way to help GM 
succeed.” Eamon Javers, Obama: ‘Reluctant Shareholder’ in GM, POLITCO.COM 
(June 1, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/23165.html (internal 
quotation marks omitted). President Obama said the goal was to “get GM back on its 
feet, take a hands off approach and get out quickly.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). As a shareholder, government officials promised to only vote on “core 
governance issues,” including the selection of the board of directors and significant 
corporate events and transactions. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
118 Neil King Jr. et al., The GM Bankruptcy: Potential Conflicts Abound in 
Government Role, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2009, at A14 [hereinafter The GM 
Bankruptcy] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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After any up-front conditions are in place, the government 
will protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing its 
ownership stake in a hands-off, commercial manner. . . . 
As a common shareholder, the government will vote on core 
governance issues, including the selection of a company’s board 
of directors and major corporate events or transactions.119
The government has insisted that it will not be involved in the 
day-to-day affairs, stating that it will only help pick GM’s first 
set of board members, remaining uninvolved after this action is 
complete.
 
120  In fact, the Treasury Department plans to hold its 
shares of GM in a blind trust.121
GM’s government-assisted bankruptcy raises the issue of 
what duties the government owes other shareholders when it 
serves as both the majority shareholder and the governmental 
regulator.  This issue differs from the situation at Bank of 
America where the government was allegedly pressuring the 
board of directors to take certain actions.
 
122
C. Citigroup and Its Controlling Shareholder, the United States 
Government 
  
Citigroup, a financial services corporation that had served as 
an aggressive player in the securitized mortgage market before 
the housing bust, first received $25 billion in TARP funds in 
October 2008.123
 
119 Fact Sheet on Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative for 
General Motors, supra note 24. In its press release, the government does not provide 
specifics as to what it means by managing in a “hands-off” manner and what 
“upfront-conditions” might be required. Id. It is interesting to note that the 
government does not mention its duty to other GM shareholders. As the majority 
shareholder, they owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders. See infra Part IV.C. 
  The company then received a second lifeline 
from the government in December in the form of $20 billion, 
120 See The GM Bankruptcy, supra note 118. 
121 Id. Blind trusts are utilized to manage assets like traditional trusts, except 
that in blind trusts, the beneficiary is unable to watch over the trustee and is, in 
essence, “blind.” See Megan J. Ballard, The Shortsightedness of Blind Trusts, 56 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 43, 58 (2007). The trustee does not tell the beneficiary about the 
identity and management of the trust property. Id. 
122 See supra Part I.A. 
123 See Citigroup Inc., N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/ 
companies/citigroup_inc/index.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2010); In Merrill Deal, U.S. 
Played Hardball, supra note 6. Citigroup received these funds on October 28, 2008 
through the sale of preferred stock and warrants to the Treasury Department under 
TARP’s Capital Purchase Program. See Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 
at 7 (Feb. 26, 2010); TRANSACTIONS REPORT, CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM, supra 
note 34. 
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resulting in a total of $45 billion in government loans.124  
Citigroup received these additional funds from the government 
after its stock fell sixty percent to a sixteen-year low in 
November 2008.125  To boost its capital reserves, and thus signal 
its future ability to absorb losses, Citigroup announced in 
February 2009 a plan to offer investors the option of exchanging 
a significant portion of preferred stock into common stock.126  
However, Citigroup received a setback in May 2009 when the 
government, after conducting an in-depth analysis to evaluate 
the bank’s “ability to withstand future losses,” decided that 
Citigroup still needed to raise an additional $5 billion to stay 
afloat.127
 
124 See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6. Once again, this 
loan was received through the sale of preferred stock and warrants to the Treasury 
Department. Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Feb. 26, 2010). 
  In response, Citigroup announced that it would expand 
its previously disclosed public exchange offers to investors to 
convert an extra $5.5 billion of its preferred shares into common 
stock, resulting in an overall total of $58 billion of preferred stock 
to be exchanged for common stock, assuming full participation by 
125 See David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees To Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 24, 2008, at A1. At the time, Citigroup had “more than 200 million 
customer accounts in 106 countries,” and thus a sharp drop in stock price would 
inevitably scare customers and hurt the bank. Id. 
126 See Citigroup Opens Its Share Offer, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at C3. 
Specifically, Citigroup initially expected to convert $58 billion worth of preferred 
stock and trust securities held by the government and private investors into common 
stock. See id.; Citi Sets Plan To Convert $58 Billion in Stock, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 
2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/citi-sets-plan-to-convert-58-billion-in-
stock/. Preferred shareholders’ rights are spelled out in a corporation’s articles of 
incorporation, and thus they are contractual in nature. See In re Appraisal of 
Metromedia Int’l Group, Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 899 (Del. Ch. 2009), modified, No. 3341-
CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2009), aff’d, 985 A.2d 389 (Del. 2009). 
By taking the preferred shares, which the government acquired through the loans 
they provided to the banks, and converting them into common shares, the 
government does not provide any additional money but the bank gains additional 
capital. See Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. May Convert Banks’ Bailouts to Equity Share, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/business/20 
bailout.html. 
127 See Deborah Solomon et al., Banks Need at Least $65 Billion in Capital, 
WALL ST. J., May 7, 2009, at A1. In spring 2009, the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury Department conducted a two-and-a-half month analysis, or “stress test,” of 
the nineteen largest financial institutions in America to assess their financial health 
and their ability to absorb losses. Id. While six banks were not required to raise any 
additional funds, other banks, including Citigroup, were told they needed to raise 
capital in order to survive. See id. Other institutions that needed additional capital 
included Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Morgan Stanley. See id. 
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investors.128  On June 10, 2009, Citigroup publicly announced 
that the government had approved the conversion plan and had 
agreed to convert $25 billion of its $45 billion preferred 
investment in the bank into approximately 7.7 billion shares of 
common stock.129  Finally, on July 30, 2009, the transaction was 
completed and resulted in the government holding a thirty-four 
percent equity stake in the company.130
In mid-September 2009, Citigroup executives began 
exploring options for reducing the government’s thirty-four 
percent ownership of the corporation, including issuing new 
shares to the public and having the Treasury Department sell 
part of its stake in Citigroup.
 
131  On December 23, 2009, 
Citigroup repaid the $20 billion in TARP preferred securities 
held by the Treasury Department, enabling the company to raise 
approximately $20.3 billion in common equity.132  As of December 
31, 2009, the Treasury Department continued to hold 
approximately 7.7 billion shares―approximately twenty-seven 
percent―of Citigroup’s common stock, and the Treasury 
Department and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) continued to hold approximately $5.3 billion of the 
company’s trust-preferred securities.133  Nevertheless, on 
January 19, 2010, Citigroup reported a $7.6 billion loss for the 
fourth quarter of 2009,134
 
128 See Citigroup Opens Its Share Offer, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at C3. 
Regarding the plan, CEO Vikram Pandit said, “Citi[group] will be among the best 
capitalized banks in the world.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 causing officials of the Treasury 
Department to delay any plans to release the company from the 
129 See Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Feb. 26, 2010); 
Citigroup, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 19 (Feb. 26, 2010); 
David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Citigroup Explores Bid To Pare U.S. Stake, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at C1; Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citi Announces Public 
Share Exchange Launch, Finalizes Definitive Agreement with U.S. Government 
(June 10, 2009), available at http://www.citibank.com/citi/press/2009/090610a.htm. 
130 See Ellis, supra note 6. According to Robert Thomson, the Editor-in-Chief of 
Dow Jones, this large government stake is one of the many reasons Citigroup was  
removed from the Dow Jones Industrial Average on June 8, 2009. See E.S. 
Browning, Travelers, Cisco Replace Citi, GM in Dow, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at 
C1. 
131 See Enrich & Solomon, supra note 129. 
132 See Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Feb. 26, 2010). 
133 Id. at 6, 8. 
134 Citigroup Inc., supra note 123. Citigroup announced a total loss for 2009 of 
$1.6 billion. Id. Moreover, the fourth quarter loss was attributed to a “$10.1 billion 
accounting charge tied to the repayment of [the company’s] bailout money.” Id. Such 
losses highlight the general concern over Citigroup’s financial condition. See id. 
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government’s control.135  The report represented a “significant 
setback” for the company and its efforts to reclaim its 
independence.136
In addition to providing funds to Citigroup, the government 
made substantial efforts to influence the company’s 
management.  Specifically, the FDIC
 
137 pressured Citigroup to 
replace some of its management because government officials 
were frustrated with the “company’s pace of change” and were 
especially concerned about the lack of commercial banking 
experience among the senior executives.138  Accordingly, federal 
officials contacted Jerry Grundhofer, who had recently joined 
Citigroup’s board and served as the former U.S. Bancorp CEO, to 
address this perceived lack in leadership.139  Because the bank 
was so heavily dependent upon government aid, many believed 





135 See Eric Dash, U.S. Is Said To Rethink Quick Sale of Citi Stake, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2009, at B1.  
136 Citigroup Inc., supra note 123. However, in March 2010, Herbert Allison, who 
oversees the government’s financial rescue plan, stated before Congress that the 
government had no plans to buy more interest in Citigroup and that it intends to 
“rapidly” rid itself of its investment in the corporation over the next year. See 
Michael R. Crittenden & Matthias Rieker, Clash over ‘Too Big To Fail’, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 5, 2010, at C3. 
137 The FDIC is an independent agency “funded [solely] by premiums that banks 
and thrift institutions pay for deposit insurance coverage and from earnings on 
investments in U.S. Treasury securities.” Who Is the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 
2011). The FDIC examines and supervises approximately 4,900 financial institutions 
by “monitoring and addressing risks” in order to protect insured depositors. Id. 
138 Damian Paletta & David Enrich, FDIC Pushes Purge at Citi, WALL ST. J., 
June 5, 2009, at A1. For example, CEO Vikram Pandit has an investment banking 
background while the majority of Citigroup’s problems are in the consumer loans 
area. Id. 
139 Id. In addition to Grundhofer, who was appointed in March, Citigroup 
appointed three more board members in July, all of whom have experience with 
changing distressed financial institutions and understanding regulatory issues. 
Robin Sidel, Citi Taps Directors with Fix-It Expertise, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2009, at 
B1. The new directors are Diana Taylor, who served as New York State Banking 
Department Superintendent; Timothy Collins, “who helped turn around a failing 
Japanese bank”; and Robert Joss, who restructured an Australian bank. Id. 
140 See Paletta & Enrich, supra note 138. In addition to TARP funds, the FDIC is 
currently helping Citigroup finance a roughly $300 billion loss-sharing agreement, 
and Citigroup has already issued around $40 billion in FDIC-backed debt since 
December 2008. Id. 
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FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair appeared to be utilizing her 
influence when she pressed another regulator to lower the 
government’s confidential ranking of Citigroup’s health, which 
would allow regulators to even further control the company.141  
As of the writing of this Article, Citigroup officials believed that 
the FDIC would place Citigroup on its “problem” list of banks if 
the company did not remove CEO Vikram Pandit and other 
executives.142  According to The Wall Street Journal, Citigroup’s 
removal of CFO Edward Kelly served as an attempt to appease 
federal regulators.143  In fact, Citigroup Chairman Richard 
Parsons had been trying to defuse a “standoff between the 
company and [certain] federal officials,” leading Pandit to 
reluctantly remove Kelly under pressure from both Parsons and 
federal officials.144
In October 2009, a government-ordered outside review of 
Citigroup’s management was released.
  
145  Conducted by 
consulting firm Egon Zehnder International,146
 
141 See id. Apparently, Bair has become more willing to challenge her peers than 
in the past, and thus, the FDIC is gaining significant influence in the financial 
world. See id. Bair predicted the housing crisis before many of her equals did, and 
the FDIC has played a pivotal role in dealing with the current financial crisis. Id. 
Thus, Bair and the FDIC have been able to exert more influence and pressure on 
Citigroup than they have exerted on financial institutions in the past. See id. 
 the review 
142 Id. Being placed on the problem list could limit Citigroup’s access to federal 
aid and cause trading partners and clients to take their business elsewhere. Id. 
Because the FDIC’s problem list is confidential, it is unknown if Citigroup has been 
added to the list. Id. 
143 See David Enrich & Robin Sidel, Citigroup Shakes up Leaders To Pacify U.S., 
WALL ST. J., July 10, 2009, at A1. Kelly, whose qualifications had been questioned 
by some federal regulators, had only been CFO from March 2009 to the beginning of 
July 2009. See id. He is now a vice chairman and advisor to Pandit. See id. 
144 Id. In June, Kelly “referred to the [FDIC] as ‘our tertiary regulator,’ behind 
the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,” a statement 
that was not well received by the FDIC and further intensified the feud between the 
two. Id. Kelly, before leaving the company, stated, “Regulators are making it 
impossible for me to do my job . . . . I’m becoming a hindrance to the company.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
145 See David Enrich & Joann S. Lublin, Good Marks, Mostly, for Citi 
Management, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2009, at C1 [hereinafter Good Marks, Mostly, for 
Citi]. The review occurred after the government’s spring 2009 stress tests. See id. 
Companies that needed more capital had to review their management and then 
notify federal regulators of their results. Id. 
146 Id. According to The Wall Street Journal, the FDIC required Citigroup to 
utilize an outside firm to review its management. Id. In fact, the FDIC initially 
rejected Citigroup’s first-choice firm to conduct the review, leading the FDIC to send 
Citigroup a list of firms the company would be allowed to use. David Enrich & 
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awarded mostly high marks to Citigroup’s management, with 
Pandit being reviewed favorably and only a few senior 
management positions receiving negative reviews.147  However, 
shortly after the review was released, FDIC officials were 
skeptical about the validity and strength of the report.148  As a 
result, the FDIC may not rely heavily on the report during its 
next regulatory review of Citigroup’s management, which could 
have a negative effect on the FDIC’s rating of the company.149
Due to the large ownership stake the government now has in 




II. THE TRADITIONAL TRIAD OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED BY, 
AND THE LEGAL PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE TO, BOARDS OF 
DIRECTORS RELEVANT TO ANALYZING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 
2008 
  Accordingly, the recent events occurring between 
Citigroup and the government raise many questions regarding 
the fiduciary duties the government owes other Citigroup 
shareholders.  Similar to GM’s situation, the government must 
simultaneously act as the governmental regulator of Citigroup 
and own a significant portion of the corporation.  
Since boards of directors consist usually of a relatively small 
number of individuals making important decisions on behalf of 
many people―the shareholders―they are vulnerable to criticism 
and lawsuits.  Fortunately, the law provides various forms of 
protection to ensure that directors do not fear costly litigation 
every time they make a decision for the corporation and its 
shareholders.151
 
Randall Smith, Review of Citi Draws Wary FDIC Response, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 
2009, at C1 [hereinafter Review of Citi Draws Wary FDIC Response]. 
  These protections include the business 
147 See Good Marks, Mostly, for Citi, supra note 145. Two directors that did not 
receive favorable reviews were Vice Chairman Lewis Kaden and Chief 
Administrative Officer Don Callahan. See id. 
148 See Review of Citi Draws Wary FDIC Response, supra note 146. Part of the 
review utilized interviews with Citigroup executives regarding their opinion of the 
effectiveness of their co-workers. See id. 
149 See id. The ratings, which are determined in part by a review of a bank’s 
management, are a factor in whether a bank is subject to tight regulatory control, 
which Citigroup is currently under. See id. 
150 See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of controlling shareholders. 
151 DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, 
GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 591–92 (2009) 
(discussing the various means of protection provided to corporate directors and 
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judgment rule, the board’s ability to place exculpatory provisions 
in the articles of incorporation, and the simple fact that 
shareholder derivative litigation is rarely successful. 
A. The Business Judgment Rule152
Shareholders may technically own a corporation, but 
directors are given broad authority over how to run the 
corporation in jurisdictions all over the country.
 
153  If 
shareholders are unhappy, they certainly have the right to sue 
directors for breach of fiduciary duty in a shareholder derivative 
action; however, directors are generally protected by the business 
judgment rule.154
 
officers, including exculpatory provisions and the business judgment rule). Also, 
Branson discusses how indemnification in the form of reimbursing directors and/or 
officers for litigation costs and liability and director and officer insurance protect 
directors; however, these two forms of protection are beyond the scope of this Article 
and will not be discussed. Id. Additionally, Branson discusses the difficulty of 
bringing a shareholder derivative suit and the decrease in the number of such suits 
filed since the 1980s due to special litigation committees’ ability to halt these types 
of lawsuits. Id. at 467–68. 
  The business judgment rule is the backbone of 
American corporate law and is frequently addressed in American 
152 This Article will discuss only those provisions of the business judgment rule 
relevant to the analysis of Bank of America, Citigroup, and GM. 
153 See 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002). Indeed, section 
141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which is important not only 
because most public companies incorporate in Delaware but also because most states 
look to Delaware for guidance in shaping their own corporate laws, states that the 
“business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010). 
154 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 153. If shareholders wish to sue the board of 
directors, they must first demand the board of directors to sue on behalf of the 
corporation. If the board refuses such demand, the court applies the business 
judgment rule in reviewing the board’s refusal to act pursuant to the shareholders’ 
demand. Id. However, if the shareholders can state reasons with particularity that 
the demand on the board should be excused as futile, the shareholders retain the 
ability to initiate the derivative action. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808, 818 
(Del. 1984) (holding that the shareholders “failed to allege facts with particularity 
indicating that the [corporation’s] directors were tainted by interest, lacked 
independence, or took action contrary to [the corporation’s] best interests,” thereby 
negating any doubt as to the applicability of the business judgment rule). In 
determining demand futility, the court “must decide whether, under the 
particularized facts alleged [by the shareholders], a reasonable doubt is created that: 
(1) the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged 
transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of [the board’s] business 
judgment.” Id. at 814. See infra Part II.C for a further discussion of shareholder 
derivative litigation. 
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courtrooms.155  Created approximately two centuries ago, the 
business judgment rule has been continuously developing 
through American common law.156  Today, the business judgment 
rule is almost exclusively an American concept.157  Despite the 
fact that the business judgment rule is consistently applied in 
courtrooms and analyzed by scholars, many consider it to be “one 
of the least understood concepts in the entire corporate field.”158
The business judgment rule can best be defined as “a 
presumption that[,] in making a business decision[,] the directors 
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in 
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests 
of the company.”
 
159  In Delaware,160
 
155 See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment 
Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 453 (2005); E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the 
New Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. LAW. 1447, 1454 (2004). 
 a shareholder plaintiff must 
prove that the directors of a corporation “breached . . . one of the 
triads of their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty[,] or due care”—
in order to overcome the presumption of the business judgment 
156 See Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and 
Accountability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 58 (2008) 
(citing S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
93, 93 (1979)). The business judgment rule has remained uncodified. Douglas M. 
Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 631, 633 (2002). 
157 Branson, supra note 156, at 633. However, in 1999, Australia enacted a new 
law based on the American construction of the business judgment rule. Id. 
158 Johnson, supra note 155 (quoting Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation 
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (1967) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
159 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. This definition is the most quoted definition of the 
business judgment rule in Delaware courts. Branson, supra note 156, at 635 n.16. 
Other definitions include the American Law Institute (“ALI”) version of the business 
judgment rule, which has been adopted by several states. Id. at 634. The ALI version 
is as follows: 
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills 
the [duty of care] if the director or officer: (1) is not interested in the subject 
of the business judgment; (2) is informed with respect to the subject of the 
business judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably believes 
to be appropriate under the circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that 
the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. 
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1994) (citation omitted). 
160 Delaware is the leader in American corporate law and is thus the best place 
to consult when analyzing the developments and current status of corporate law, 
including the business judgment rule. See Scarlett, supra note 156, at 59. 
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rule.161  If a plaintiff overcomes that presumption, the burden 
shifts to the directors, who then have the opportunity to prove 
their case and free themselves from liability.162
the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the 
decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be 
attributed to a rational business purpose[,] or reach their 
decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure 
to consider all material facts reasonably available.
  Thus, decisions 
made by directors will not be reversed by courts unless the 
following circumstances can be proven: 
163
Through this presumption, the board of directors’ business 
decisions are protected from being second-guessed by judges in a 
courtroom so long as the decisions are “made in good faith and in 
the exercise of due care.”
 
164  Thus, the business judgment rule 
acts as a standard of review for analyzing the decisions made by 
boards of directors in order to determine liability,165 with 
directors only needing to demonstrate “some (slight) care and 
only a rational (plausible) basis for the decision made.”166  
Additionally, the business judgment rule helps promote the full 
exercise of managerial power, so that the directors, and not the 
shareholders, make the decisions and control the affairs of a 
corporation.167
 
161 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). The business 
judgment rule will not apply if the directors committed an act of fraud, illegality, or 
waste. See Scarlett, supra note 156, at 59–60. Moreover, the duty of good faith is not 
always considered a stand-alone duty, but is instead viewed as a sub-category of the 
duty of loyalty. See infra notes 181–88 and accompanying text. 
 
162 See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (stating that “[i]f the [business judgment] 
rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors, the proponents of the 
challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the ‘entire fairness’ of the 
transaction to the shareholder plaintiff” (quoting Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 
1376 (Del. 1993))); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 
1279 (Del. 1989); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); FLETCHER 
ET AL., supra note 153. 
163 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000). 
164 Veasey, supra note 155, at 1454. 
165 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004). In his article, Bainbridge argues that the business 
judgment rule often acts more like an abstention doctrine as courts “refrain from 
reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions for review are satisfied.” Id. 
166 Branson, supra note 156, at 635. 
167 Janet E. Kerr, Developments in Corporate Governance: The Duty of Good 
Faith and Its Impact on Director Conduct, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1037, 1074 
(2006). 
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No clear-cut answer exists as to why the business judgment 
rule was developed,168 but several theories have been 
promulgated.  One of the primary justifications for the business 
judgment rule is that “judges are not business experts.”169  
Indeed, the Delaware Court of Chancery has stated that 
“[b]ecause businessmen and women are correctly perceived as 
possessing skills, information and judgment not possessed by 
reviewing courts . . .  courts have long been reluctant to second-
guess such decisions when they appear to have been made in 
good faith.”170  Thus, the business judgment rule encourages 
directors to take risks without fear of being held liable for their 
decisions, promoting the view that directors should not be held 
liable for actions that in hindsight are not ideal.171  Moreover, 
because the law and the marketplace value the board of directors’ 
authority, the business judgment rule provides protection from 
judicial encroachment.172  Furthermore, the business judgment 
rule prevents stockholders from asserting and forcing their 
demands, which may not be in the best interest of the majority of 
shareholders, upon directors.173  Lastly, the business judgment 
rule recognizes that shareholders “voluntarily undertake the risk 
of a business judgment,” but always retain the power to vote 
directors out of office.174
The first of the three triads of the business judgment rule is 
the duty of due care.  The duty of due care “places an affirmative 
obligation on the directors to protect the interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders when making decisions on 




168 See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 
WIS. L. REV. 573, 573 (stating, “thousands of pages of corporate law scholarship and 
commentary have been devoted to these fundamental questions, yet we remain short 
of any broad consensus as to the answers”). 
  As a result, “directors must 
critically assess relevant information before making a 
169 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
170 In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
171 See Johnson, supra note 155, at 455–56. 
172 See Bainbridge, supra note 165, at 108. 
173 Kerr, supra note 167, at 1074–75. 
174 Id. at 1075. 
175 Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation: The Delaware Courts’ Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 589, 610 (2008) [hereinafter Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability]; see 
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891) (stating that directors have a duty “to 
supervise the business with attention . . . [and] to use proper care in the 
appointment of agents”). 
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decision.”176  The duty of due care “requires directors to act with 
the same ‘amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent 
[persons] would use in similar circumstances.’ ”177  Moreover, the 
duty of due care requires directors to “ ‘consider all material 
information reasonably available’ in making business 
decisions.”178  The duty of due care is breached once a director, 
while making a decision on behalf of the corporation, fails “to act 
in an informed and deliberate manner”179 or simply makes “an 
unintelligent and unadvised judgment.”180
The duty of loyalty is the second facet of the business 
judgment rule.  “[T]he duty of loyalty mandates that the best 
interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes precedence 
over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling 
shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally.”
  
181  
The duty of loyalty, “requir[ing] an undivided and unselfish 
loyalty to the corporation[,] demands that there be no conflict 
between duty and self-interest.”182  To illustrate, a director may 
be considered “interested” if he or she will receive a financial 
gain from a transaction that is greater than the benefit received 
by the stockholders,183
 
176 Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability, supra note 175. 
 or if the director takes action to avoid the 
repercussions of a decision that would impact him or her 
177 Bainbridge, supra note 165, at 88 (quoting Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. 
Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)). 
178 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000)), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 
(Del. 2006). 
179 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
180 Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. 
Ch. 1933)). 
181 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); see Weinberger 
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
182 Disney I, 907 A.2d at 751 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 
1939)). The case further states: 
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound 
knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule 
that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and 
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only 
affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his 
charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to 
the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and 
ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable 
and lawful exercise of its powers. 
Id. 
183 See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
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negatively but would not necessarily have the same effect on the 
corporation.184  Additionally, a director can be viewed as 
“interested” if he or she “receives a substantial benefit from 
supporting a transaction.”185  The duty of loyalty can also be 
breached through self-dealing, the receipt of excessive 
compensation, the use of corporate funds to perpetuate control, 
insider trading, the usurpation of corporate opportunities, and 
competition among the companies of corporate officers and 
directors.186
The third duty of the business judgment rule triad is the 
duty of good faith.  While “good faith” was a considered in early 
business judgment rule cases, it has seldom been the deciding 
factor.
 
187  Moreover, some disagreement exists as to whether it is 
a stand-alone duty or a sub-category of the duty of loyalty.188  In 
the past, the duty of good faith was defined in the context of bad 
faith, as the Delaware Supreme Court once stated, “[i]n the 
absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the directors or of 
a gross abuse of discretion[,] the business judgment of directors 
will not be interfered with by the courts.”189  Bad faith involves a 
“fiduciary intentionally fail[ing] to act in the face of a known duty 
to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.”190  
Today, the duty of good faith “works as part of the articulation of 
the business judgment rule that applies to the directors’ decision-
making process and it is part of the directors’ oversight 
responsibility.”191
 
184 See id. 
  Moreover, the duty of good faith has been said 
185 Cede, 634 A.2d at 362. 
186 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 306–07, 
320–23 (2002). 
187 See Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability, supra note 175, at 619. 
188 See Kerr, supra note 167, at 1049–50. In Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 
2006), the Delaware Supreme Court clarified its earlier ruling in In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), by holding 
that failing to implement a system of monitors or controls, or a conscious failure to 
use an implemented system of monitors or controls, would constitute a breach of a 
director’s duty of loyalty “by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good 
faith.” Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70. 
189 Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492–93 (Del. 1966). 
190 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 
2006). 
191 Veasey, supra note 155, at 1455. In In re Caremark, the court stated that a 
director owes a duty of good faith to ensure that a corporation has a monitoring and 
reporting system, which the board approves, and failure to do so can make the 
director liable for damages to the company for illegal activity by employees. See In re 
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
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to “involve all the aspects of honesty and integrity,”192 and 
requires that directors’ motivation stem from “a true faithfulness 
and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.”193  The duty of good faith can be violated by 
“intentional or unintentional misconduct[,] reckless behavior 
given a certain duration or magnitude[,] conscious disregard of 
known risks[,] and behavior that cannot rationally be explained 
on any other grounds.”194
The Delaware Supreme Court recently addressed the duty of 
good faith in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan,
 
195 where 
shareholders sued the board of directors of Lyondell Chemical 
Company for not acting in good faith while selling the 
company.196  While the board of directors failed to perform an 
auction or a market check before selling the company,197 they did 
meet several times during the week they considered the buyer’s 
offer, and the CEO attempted to negotiate better terms for the 
transaction.198  Thus, while the board of directors’ behavior was 
not perfect, the Delaware Supreme Court did not find that their 
behavior reached the level of bad faith as “the directors’ failure to 
take any specific steps during the sale process could not have 
demonstrated a conscious disregard of their duties.”199  The court 
also noted that a “vast difference [exists] between an inadequate 
or flawed effort to carry out fiduciary duties and a conscious 
disregard for those duties.”200
 
192 E. Norman Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of 
Directors’ Business Decisions—An Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy and 
Counseling Directors, 37 BUS. LAW. 1247, 1251 (1982). 
 
193 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); see also In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (elaborating further). 
194 Kerr, supra note 167, at 1042. 
195 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
196 See id. at 237. 
197 Id. at 243. 
198 Id. at 242. Additionally, “the directors were disinterested and 
independent; . . . they were generally aware of the company’s value and its 
prospects; and . . . they considered the offer, under the time constraints imposed by 
the buyer, with the assistance of financial and legal advisors.” Id. at 237. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 243. However, the court suggested that the board of directors may have 
breached their duty of care. See id. 
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B. Exculpatory Provisions in the Articles of Incorporation 
In addition to the business judgment rule, boards of directors 
are often protected from liability for their decisions by state 
statutes.201  Indeed, Delaware enacted section 102(b)(7) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law in response to the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,202 where the 
court held directors of a corporation personally liable for 
breaching their duty of care in a lawsuit initiated by 
shareholders.203  Section 102(b)(7) allows shareholders to adopt a 
clause in their corporation’s articles of incorporation protecting 
directors from personal liability for monetary damages for 
breaching the duty of care.204  Since Delaware enacted section 
102(b)(7), all other jurisdictions, with the exception of the 
District of Columbia, have enacted a similar provision.205  The 
provisions adopted by other states either completely eliminate 
holding directors personally liable for monetary damages for the 
breach of duty of due care, or instead, allow the articles of 
incorporation to eliminate director liability if the shareholders 
choose to adopt such a provision.206  Additionally, virtually every 
corporation has adopted an exculpatory provision to address the 
situation where the state statute did not eliminate liability but 
rather gave corporations the option to adopt an exculpatory 
provision.207
 
201 See Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Managerial Liability and 
Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal To Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection, 
45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 307 (2006). 
 
202 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
203 See Honabach, supra note 201; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) 
(2010). Before this case, directors were assumed to not be liable for breaching the 
duty of care. Id. However, they could still be held personally liable for breaching the 
duty of loyalty. Id. 
204 See § 102(b)(7). The statute also provides that the exculpatory provision must 
not include immunity from liability for the following: (1) breaching the duty of 
loyalty; (2) not acting in good faith, omissions not made in good faith, or acts or 
omissions involving intentional misconduct or knowingly violating the law; 
(3) unlawful payment of dividends or unlawful stock purchases or redemptions; or 
(4) transactions where the director receives an inappropriate personal benefit. See 
id. 
205 See Honabach, supra note 201. 
206 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. 
REV. 477, 490 (2000). 
207 See id.; Honabach, supra note 201, at 313. 
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C. Shareholder Derivative Litigation208
In addition to the business judgment rule and exculpatory 
provisions provided for in articles of incorporation, boards of 
directors are protected from liability in lawsuits simply because 
shareholder derivative litigation is rarely successful.  When 
shareholders wish to bring derivative litigation, they face several 
challenges that are in place to ensure the litigation will be 
valuable, and not detrimental, to the corporation.
 
209  Thus, 
shareholder derivative litigation is often quickly dismissed, 
protecting the board of directors.210  However, through the 
growth in shareholder activism, as well as the increase in proxy 
access, shareholder derivative litigation is growing and exposing 
boards more than ever before.211
Shareholder derivative litigation has increased and survived 
more motions to dismiss post-2001, due arguably in part to the 
corporate scandals that occurred in 2001, namely Enron and 
Worldcom.
 
212  While Delaware has not announced new standards 
for the business judgment rule, it appears that judicial 
enforcement of these standards has changed.213
 
208 This Section does not provide a complete discussion of shareholder derivative 
litigation, but instead only discusses those aspects relevant to the current issue. 
  Indeed, the 
former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Norman E. 
Veasey, has acknowledged that Delaware courts are applying 
new scrutiny, yet also the “same law,” to defendants in derivative 
actions, and that Delaware courts’ “expectations of directors are 
209 See Larry E. Ribstein, Litigating in LLCs, 64 BUS. LAW. 739, 740 (2009). 
Shareholder plaintiffs often must place a demand on the corporation or have their 
lawsuit approved by the special litigation committee. See id. 
210 See generally id. (describing derivative suits). 
211 First, in the hopes of increasing shareholders activism, the SEC has taken 
steps to make proxy information available on the Internet, making it much easier for 
shareholders to submit proxy materials and participate in their corporation’s voting 
process. See Blake H. Crawford, Eliminating the Executive Overcompensation 
Problem: How the SEC and Congress Have Failed and Why the Shareholders Can 
Prevail, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 273, 294 (2009). Additionally, since the 
1950s, institutional ownership of shares in corporations has increased dramatically, 
with those institutions becoming very active shareholders through the process of 
submitting shareholder proposals. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) 
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447, 449 (1991). 
212 Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability, supra note 175, at 590, 593. 
213 See id. 
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evolving.”214  The best example of this new shift is found in In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,215 where Disney 
shareholder plaintiffs survived multiple pretrial motions and the 
case subsequently went to trial.216  While the plaintiffs ultimately 
lost,217
While boards of directors are still somewhat protected from 
shareholder derivative litigation, one of the consequences of the 
recent change in the American economy is that corporations are 
being sued more frequently and for more reasons.
 the fact that the case survived so many pre-trial motions 
indicates that shareholder derivative litigation may be exposing 
boards of directors more than in previous years. 
218  Indeed, 
more securities class-action lawsuits have occurred since the 
financial crisis began.219
 
214 John Gibeaut, Stock Responses: Shareholders Ask for Changes in Corporate 
Governance and the Courts Are Starting To See It Their Way, 89 A.B.A. J. 38, 40 
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  Thus, while shareholder derivative 
litigation does act as a way of protecting boards of directors, the 
current financial crisis has led plaintiffs to find other ways to 
hold directors liable for their poor business decisions. 
215 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  
216 See id. at 35; see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 
106 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re Nat’l Auto Credit, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A.19028, 
2003 WL 139768 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2003); Omni Care, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 
822 A.2d 397 (Del. 2002); Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 803 
A.2d 428 (Del. 2002); Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257 (Del. 2002). 
217 See Brehm, 906 A.2d at 35–36. 
218 See James L. Sanders, Am I Liable?, DIRECTORSHIP, June/July 2009, at 46. 
Not only are boards of directors being sued by angry shareholders, but the 
government is increasing its scrutiny of boards of directors through its own 
regulatory agencies, including the SEC. See id. Indeed, Citigroup was recently sued 
in a shareholder derivative action for excessive payments made to a former CEO on 
the basis that the payment was wasting corporate assets. See In re Citigroup Inc. 
S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d at 112. In fact, the court denied the motion to 
dismiss the claim for corporate waste. Id. at 140. 
219 See Alistair Barr, Financial Crisis Triggers More Class-Action Suits, 
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 30, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/financial-crisis-
triggers-more-class-action-lawsuits. According to Barr’s article, Stanford Law 
School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse found 220 securities class action 
lawsuits in 2008, 173 in 2007, and 115 in 2006. Id. The most recent time that there 
were this many class action lawsuits was in 2002, during “the dot-com bust” and the 
Enron and WorldCom affairs. See id. 
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III. THE DUTY OF CANDOR: DELAWARE’S ADDITIONAL DUTY OWED 
TO SHAREHOLDERS BY DIRECTORS 
In addition to the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders 
under the business judgment rule, Delaware, as well as other 
states, has developed an additional duty known as the duty of 
candor.220  The duty of candor “flows from the broader fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty.”221  Sometimes it is credited as being a 
stand-alone duty, while at other times it is considered part of the 
duty of due care and the duty of loyalty.222  Over the past twenty 
years, it has gained prominence, in part due to the popularity of 
exculpatory provisions in articles of incorporation that eliminate 
duty of due care suits.223  As a result, duty of candor violations 
and subsequent litigation have become more important to 
shareholder plaintiffs.  However, because it is unclear whether it 
is part of the duty of due care, duty of loyalty, or a stand-alone 
duty, courts are inconsistent with how they treat duty of candor 
allegations.224
 
220 See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 462 (stating that “[c]ourts in states 
other than Delaware have recognized the right and utilized the duty of candor 
terminology”). Branson points to Persinger v. Carmazzi, 441 S.E.2d 646, 652 (W. Va. 
1994), and Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d 389, 395 (Minn. App. 1997), as examples. 
Id. The duty of candor in Delaware is relevant to this discussion, as the three 
corporations profiled in this Article are all incorporated in Delaware. See 
BankAmerica Corporation, Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of 
BankAmerica Corporation (Apr. 28, 2010), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MzM0NTR8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBl
PTM=&t=1; Citigroup Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Citigroup Inc. 
(Oct. 30, 2009), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/ 
data/citigroup_rci.pdf?ieNocache=934; General Motors Holding Company, Amended 
and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of General Motors Holding Company (Nov. 
1, 2010), available at http://www.gm.com/investors/corporate-governance/docs/GM 
CertificateofIncorporation.pdf.  
 
221 Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 542 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
222 BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 461 (stating that “the [Delaware] court 
has been somewhat coy pinning down whether the duty of candor springs from the 
duty of care, the duty of loyalty, or is a free standing obligation”). However, the issue 
of whether shareholders have been notified of the necessary information to make an 
informed decision is not related to the management of the corporation, and thus not 
a decision the business judgment rule would protect, supporting the argument that 
the duty of candor is not under the business judgment rule. See In re Anderson, 
Clayton S’holders’ Litig., 519 A.2d 669, 675 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
223 BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 461; see also infra Part II.B. 
224 Compare BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 461 (stating that “articles of 
incorporation can result in exculpation and dismissal of duty of candor violations, at 
least if no self dealing or ‘intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law was 
involved’ ” (citing Arnold v. Soc. for Savings Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994)), 
with Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 783 (Del. 1993) (stating that an exculpatory 
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Known alternatively as the duty of disclosure,225 the duty of 
candor is breached when directors make “a materially false 
statement, [omit] a material fact, or [make] a partial disclosure 
that is materially misleading.”226  The duty of candor does not 
create an original disclosure rule, but instead “represents 
nothing more than the well-recognized proposition that directors 
of Delaware corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose 
fully and fairly all material information within the board’s 
control when it seeks shareholder action.”227
Delaware law also protects shareholders who receive false 
communications from directors even in the absence of a request 
for shareholder action.  When the directors are not seeking 
shareholder action, but are deliberately misinforming 
shareholders about the business of the corporation, either 
directly or by a public statement, there is a violation of fiduciary 
duty.
  Furthermore, in 
Malone v. Brincat, the Delaware Supreme Court stated: 
228
Thus, even if shareholder action has not been requested by the 
board of directors, directors of corporations have a “fiduciary duty 
to shareholders to exercise due care, good faith and loyalty” when 
communicating to the public or to shareholders regarding the 
business of the corporation.
 
229  What is not clear after Malone, 
however, is if the information that the directors presented to 
shareholders later becomes false, whether it is a violation of the 
duty of candor to not communicate the new information to 
shareholders.230
 
provision did not excuse directors from duty of candor liability). In essence, it 
appears that if a duty of candor allegation stems from a violation of the duty of 
loyalty or another duty, it can escape dismissal. BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 
461 (citing In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 91 F. Supp. 2d 706, 731–32 (D. Del. 2000)). 
 
225 See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (preferring the term “duty of 
disclosure”). However, after Stroud, courts continued using “duty of candor.” 
BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 460–61. 
226 Pfeffer v. Redstone, 965 A.2d 676, 684 (Del. 2009). 
227 Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84; see also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) 
(stating that “[t]he duty of disclosure obligates directors to provide the stockholders 
with accurate and complete information material to a transaction or other corporate 
event that is being presented to them for action”). 
228 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998). 
229 Id. at 10. 
230 One commentator has suggested that an affirmative obligation to disclose 
information when shareholder action is not requested should only occur when either 
the scenario is one where the federal laws do not protect shareholders or “where 
Delaware law can logically invoke traditional fiduciary duty principles to fill in that 
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Thus, under the duty of candor, directors owe a fiduciary 
duty to disclose all material information to shareholders in the 
following situations: (1) when seeking shareholder approval of 
transactions that require a shareholder vote; (2) when seeking 
shareholder approval of “invalid or suspicious transactions,” 
including self-dealing or compensation transactions; and 
(3) when directors willfully communicate to shareholders or the 
public about the corporation.231
IV. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT LAWS AND DUTIES DIRECTORS AND 
MAJORITY AND CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS MUST FOLLOW 
  As expected, the duty of candor 
is especially relevant to the situations of Bank of America. 
Various common laws and state statutes may protect 
directors, but directors still owe fiduciary duties under state law 
to stockholders and must comply with federal laws, such as Rule 
10b-5 of the federal securities laws.  Additionally, majority or 
controlling shareholders can owe fiduciary duties to their fellow 
shareholders.  However, it is unclear whether these fiduciary 
duties change when the government begins acting as both an 




gap.” Holly M. Barbera, Note, Fiduciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations: 
Resolving Questions After Malone v. Brincat, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 578 (2001). 
Barbera further suggests that there should be no general disclosure duty when there 
is not a request for stockholder action, as there are business concerns regarding 
disclosing information to the public and federal laws that protect shareholders. See 
id. at 575–76. However, a history exists between Delaware laws and the state’s blue 
sky laws, which consequently overlap with federal securities law Rule 10b-5. 
Specifically, section 7303 of the Delaware Securities Act states: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase 
of any security . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (2010). As such, in response to the commentator, 
simply because the Delaware laws and the federal laws overlap does not mean that 
the duty of candor should only apply when no overlap exists and the federal laws fail 
to protect shareholders. In fact, the overlap of laws is truly irrelevant because 
overlap does not signify that the laws are ineffective. In fact, it is suggested later in 
this Article that the duty of candor should be extended to include a disclosure duty 
when new material information has been learned that would clarify a previously 
made statement. See infra Part V.A.5. 
231 See Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Corporate 
Officers’ Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 233 (2009). 
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controlling shareholder.  Parts A and B discuss the duties owed 
by directors, and Part C addresses the duties owed by majority 
and controlling shareholders.  
A. Rule 10b-5 
In addition to the duties directors owe to shareholders under 
common law,232 directors must comply with the federal securities 
law known as “Rule 10b-5.”  Section 10 of the Securities 
Exchange Act was created to “protect investors, to help ensure 
fair dealing in the securities markets, and to promote ethical 
business practices.”233  Section 10(b) is a “catch-all” provision that 
concerns the purchase or sale of a security and covers both 
publicly and privately traded corporations.234
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange . . . (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.
  Rule 10b-5 states, 
in relevant part: 
235
To prove a section 10(b) violation, the plaintiff—either the 
SEC or a private individual
 
236—must prove the following: (1) that 
the requisite jurisdictional means are satisfied; (2) that the 
defendant is either a purchaser or seller of the security at issue; 
(3) that there was “manipulation” or “deception,” and not merely 
a breach of a fiduciary duty; (4) that the misstatement or 
omission of fact was material; (5) that the defendant acted with 
scienter; (6) if relevant, that the plaintiff relied on the 
misrepresentation; (7) that causation is established; (8) that the 
manipulation or deception was connected to the purchase or sale 
of security; (9) that the defendant had a duty to disclose if the 
allegation is based upon silence; and (10) that damages were 
suffered.237
 
232 See supra Part II.A, III. 
 
233 MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 393 (rev. 5th ed. 2009). 
234 Id. 
235 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
236 BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 517. 
237 Id. at 518–19. A material fact has been defined by the Supreme Court as one 
that, if omitted, a “substantial likelihood [exists] that a reasonable shareholder 
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In determining whether the scienter element has been 
satisfied, most courts have concluded that recklessness is 
sufficient.238
a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or 
even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of 
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the 
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware 
of it.
  Reckless conduct has been defined as  
239
Such state of mind can be found in a variety of ways.  If an 
individual does not know a statement is false, yet utters it for 
 
 
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
238 William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the 
Federal Securities Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 179 (1997); see McLean v. Alexander, 
599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding reckless conduct to be the “minimum 
threshold for liability under [section] 10(b)”); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 
570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that “recklessness satisfies the scienter 
requirement”); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(holding that “the definition of ‘reckless behavior’ should not be a liberal one,” but 
rather “a lesser form of intent”). In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), 
the Supreme Court raised, but did not decide, the issue as to “whether, in some 
circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under [section] 10(b).” 
Id. at 193 n.12. Furthermore, in an effort to deter abusive securities litigation 
practices and reconcile the conflicting pleading standards among the circuits, 
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (West 2011) (“PSLRA”). Christopher J. Hardy, The PSLRA’s 
Heightened Pleading Standard: Does Severe Recklessness Constitute Scienter?, 35 
U.S.F. L. REV. 565, 565 (2001). The PSLRA requires a plaintiff, “with respect to each 
act or omission alleged, to . . . state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” Id. at 571 (first 
alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). While this provision seeks to heighten the pleading standard required of 
plaintiffs, the PSLRA’s vague statutory language fails to define the term “strong 
inference.” Id. Nevertheless, most circuits have concluded that some form of 
recklessness satisfies the scienter element under section 10(b), but they differ “in the 
degree of recklessness required.” Id. at 572; see Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 
F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that section 10(b) requires a showing of 
“extreme recklessness”); In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff “must plead, in great detail, facts that constitute 
strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct”); In 
re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
“plaintiffs may plead scienter [under section] 10(b) . . . by alleging facts giving rise to 
a strong inference of recklessness”); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 
534–35 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that reckless conduct remains a sufficient basis for 
liability under section 10(b)); Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (holding that simple recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement). 
239 Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting 
Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)). 
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others to rely on when lacking affirmative knowledge of its truth, 
he or she is considered reckless.240  Additionally, if an individual 
deliberately avoids the truth by failing to consult available 
information, a finding of recklessness will likely be made.241
The most relevant element for the topic at hand concerns 
whether the defendant had a duty to disclose.  Generally, the 
mere fact that a party holds material information does not mean 
that the corporation must disclose that material information to 
stockholders.
 
242  Indeed, the duty to disclose hinges on the terms 
of Rule 10b-5, which prohibits omissions of a material fact only if 
the fact was “necessary . . . to make the statements made” not 
materially misleading.243  In this context, the focus turns on the 
presence of a duty to update and a duty to correct.  The “duty to 
update may exist when a prior disclosure that, although accurate 
when made, . . . becomes materially misleading” and continues to 
be relied upon by investors.244  In determining whether a duty to 
update exists, courts consider “the significance and type of 
information contained in the earlier statement, the predictive 
quality of the statement, and the time lapse between the earlier 
statement and current information.”245  The duty to correct 
concerns statements that were “materially untrue, incomplete, or 
misleading” when they were made.246  Specifically, “if a disclosure 
is . . . misleading when made, and the speaker thereafter learns 
of this [fact],” a duty to correct arises.247
 
240 Kuehnle, supra note 238, at 192. 
  With regards to 
projections, even if a statement is accurate when made, but has 
forward-looking intent or relates to policies or practices that the 
company has stated it will follow, such statement may give rise 
241 Id. at 192–93. 
242 See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We do 
not hold that whenever a corporation speaks, it must disclose every piece of 
information in its possession that could affect the price of its stock.”); Weiner v. 
Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In general, [s]ection 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 do not impose a duty on defendants to correct prior statements—
particularly statements of intent—so long as those statements were true when 
made.” (citing In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (1989)). 
243 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
244 MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES 2-
7 (1984); see Weiner, 129 F.3d at 316 (citing In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 
F.2d at 1245). 
245 STEINBERG, supra note 244, at 2-7 to 2-8. 
246 Jeffrey A. Brill, The Status of the Duty To Update, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 605, 617 (1998); see STEINBERG, supra note 244, at 2-24.  
247 STEINBERG, supra note 244, at 2-24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to a duty to update when it becomes inaccurate because of a 
subsequent event.248  Additionally, as part of what is known as 
“Item 303,” when public companies file certain documents with 
the SEC, the company must also “[i]dentify any known trends or 
any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that 
will result in or that are reasonably likely to result in the 
[company’s] liquidity” materially changing.249
B. The Duty of Directors To Be Fair to Shareholders 
  As expected, Rule 
10b-5 is of particular relevance to the government’s interaction 
with Bank of America. 
It is true that “directors of Delaware corporations stand in a 
fiduciary relationship not only to the stockholders but also to the 
corporations upon whose boards they serve.”250  However, 
shareholders elect the directors to the board, and as with any 
election, directors often may know which shareholder, or which 
group of shareholders, was responsible for their election.  These 
directors have been defined as “constituency directors,” or 
“representative directors,” as they “represent” a group of 
shareholders.251  Accordingly, similar to other elections, directors 
may feel a responsibility to serve the constituency that helped 
them obtain their position.  However, the board of directors must 
serve all shareholders fairly, as they owe a fiduciary duty to the 
corporation itself and all the shareholders, not just the 
shareholders that elected them to the board.252
 
248 See id. at 2-25. 
  Moreover, even if 
a director feels a responsibility to a certain constituency of a 
corporation or particular block of shareholders, “the directors’ 
duties to stockholders must trump their concerns for other 
249 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (a)(1) (2010). 
250 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (citing Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 
510 (Del. 1939)). 
251 E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a 
Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 
761, 763 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Examples of constituency 
directors include those “designated by creditors, venture capitalists, labor unions, 
controlling or other substantial stockholders, or preferred stockholders; directors 
elected by a particular class of stockholders or by a minority interest under a 
cumulative voting scheme; or directors representing other constituencies.” Id.  
252 In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 676 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(stating that “[t]he board owes its fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
stockholders, not merely to a set of stockholders as of a certain record date”). 
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constituencies.”253  In fact, it has been argued that a constituency 
director should always assume that (1) his fiduciary duties are 
owed to the corporation and its shareholders; and (2) if the 
interests of the corporation and the shareholders are not the 
same, a judge may employ equitable principles to reach a 
decision as to whether a director breached his or her fiduciary 
duty.254  Therefore, while a director may be aware that a block of 
shareholders, such as the majority, was responsible for electing 
him or her to the board, this knowledge does not give the director 
permission to favor this constituency when making decisions.255
C. The Fiduciary Duty Owed by the Majority and Controlling 
Shareholders to Minority Shareholders 
  
This duty of fairness is especially relevant to Citigroup and GM, 
where the government owns significant amounts of shares in 
each corporation. 
Directors and management owe the traditional fiduciary 
duties to shareholders; however, shareholders can also owe a 
fiduciary duty to fellow shareholders.256  Generally, it is the 
majority shareholder who owes a fiduciary duty to the minority 
shareholders.257  “Under Delaware [state] law, a shareholder 
owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or 
exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.”258
 
253 Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 251, at 766. Veasey and Di Guglielmo 
point out that one constituency, creditors, have other means to protect their 
interests, including contracts, fraud and fraudulent conveyance law, bankruptcy 
law, commercial law, and implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, among 
other laws. See id. at 766–67, 767 n.17. 
  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he majority has 
254 Id. at 767. For further discussion of the duties owed by constituency directors 
that are beyond the scope of this article, see id. 
255 See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004) (“The primary basis 
upon which a director’s independence must be measured is whether the director’s 
decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board, rather than 
extraneous considerations or influences.” (citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 
936 (Del. 1993)). 
256 See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 
60 STAN L. REV. 1255, 1261–62 (2008). There are three key groups in corporations—
shareholders, the board of directors, and management—each having certain rights, 
privileges, duties, and responsibilities. Id. at 1257. 
257 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994) 
(quoting Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 
1987)). 
258 Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1344 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985)). 
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the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary 
relation toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself 
or its officers and directors.”259
Even if a shareholder does not own the majority of shares in 
a corporation, in some situations, he or she can still be a 
controlling shareholder through a finding of a dominating 
relationship, and thus owe fiduciary duties to fellow 
shareholders.  According to the Delaware Supreme Court: 
 
[A] shareholder who owns less than 50% of a corporation’s 
outstanding stocks does not, without more, become a controlling 
shareholder of that corporation, with a concomitant fiduciary 
status.  For a dominating relationship to exist in the absence of 
controlling stock ownership, a plaintiff must allege domination 
by a minority shareholder through actual control of corporation 
conduct.260
“Control” and “domination” have been defined as implying “a 
direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with 
the wishes or interests of the corporation (or persons) doing the 
controlling.”
 
261  Thus, no actual percentage or threshold exists 
that qualifies one as a “controlling shareholder,” but instead 
one’s behavior determines if one qualifies as a controlling 
shareholder.262  In most cases where a shareholder has been 
considered to be a controlling shareholder, he or she has owned 
almost fifty percent of the corporation; however one New York 
case found a controlling shareholder in a corporation in which 
the shareholder owned three percent of the company yet had six 
director nominees.263
 
259 S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1919). Additionally, the Court 
stated, “[i]t is the fact of control of the common property held and exercised, not the 
particular means by which or manner in which the control is exercised, that creates 
the fiduciary obligation.” Id. at 492. 
 
260 Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1114 (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument 
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989)); see Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 122–
23 (Del. Ch. 1971). When the court is discussing an “absence of controlling stock 
ownership,” it is referring to an absence of a majority stock ownership. In Kahn, the 
court found that minority shareholder Alcatel, U.S.A., a corporation, which held a 
43.3% minority share of stock in corporation Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 
was a controlling shareholder because it exercised control of Lynch by dominating its 
corporate affairs, particularly at board meetings with the Alcatel-appointed 
directors. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1115. 
261 Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 123. 
262 See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1114; Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 123. 
263 See In re Caplan, 20 A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep’t), aff’d, 14 
N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964); Marcel Kahan & Edward 
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The specific fiduciary duty owed to the minority shareholders 
by the majority or controlling shareholders is that of loyalty.264  
The majority or controlling shareholders must not use the fact 
that they own the majority of shares or act as the controlling 
shareholder of the corporation to dominate the affairs of the 
corporation in a way that is advantageous to them such that they 
receive a material financial benefit at the cost of the minority 
shareholders.265  However, if a controlling shareholder can prove 
that a transaction was still “intrinsically fair” to the corporation 
despite also benefiting the controlling or majority shareholder, he 
or she can avoid being held liable.266
a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders 
[is a fiduciary].  Their powers are powers in trust.  Their 
dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous 
scrutiny[,] and where any of their contracts or engagements 
with the corporation is challenged[,] the burden is on the 
director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the 
transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the 
viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein.
  Indeed, the Supreme Court 




The situations concerning the recent financial crisis not only 
make for dramatic stories of political power struggles that either 
directly or indirectly affect most Americans, but also illustrate 
many potential violations of federal and common law corporate 
 
Rock, How To Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, 
and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 743 n.176 (2009). Thus, even 
though the government only has a thirty-four percent equity interest in Citigroup—
with only twenty-seven percent of that being in common stock—if its actions are 
enough that it is exercising control and domination over the corporation, it will be 
considered a controlling shareholder. See supra notes 130, 133, and accompanying 
text. See infra Part V.B.2 for a discussion of the government’s duties as Citigroup’s 
controlling shareholder and regulator. 
264 See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 256, at 1265–66. 
265 See id. (citing Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471–72 (Cal. 
1969)); see also Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1115; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 
720 (Del. 1971). A traditional example of the controlling shareholders violating their 
duty of loyalty to the minority is in a “freeze-out” merger, where the minority, 
thanks to the influence of the majority or controlling shareholders, must sell their 
shares at an extremely low price to a corporation owned by the controlling or 
majority shareholder. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 256, at 1266. 
266 See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 256, at 1266. 
267 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (citations omitted). 
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laws.  Indeed, these situations highlight a brand new territory in 
American corporate law: what is and is not legal when the 
government interacts with and gains influence and control over 
the private sector.  Additionally, the financial crisis has led to 
hints of change in governmental influence in the corporate sector, 
which may only be the beginning of a sweeping change in the 
government’s role in business in America. 
A. Possible Legal Issues Arising When the Government 
Influences Boards of Directors 
As discussed above, the government has exerted its influence 
on boards of directors, causing directors to make decisions they 
would not otherwise had made if they were acting independently.  
However, boards of directors still owe their fiduciary duties to 
shareholders, not the government when it is simply acting as a 
creditor or stakeholder in the corporation.268
1. The Duty of Loyalty and the Bank of America Board 
  Thus, boards of 
directors, such as the boards of Bank of America and Citigroup, 
are likely not immune from liability from the various forms of 
protection discussed. 
First, the business judgment rule may not protect the board 
in the event that they have violated their fiduciary duties to 
stockholders.  For example, if the board of directors of Bank of 
America continued in their transaction with Merrill Lynch as a 
result of government pressure, the fear of job loss, and self-
interest, violation of the duty of loyalty becomes an issue.269
 
268 See supra note 27 for definition of a stakeholder. Creditors are often 
considered stakeholders. However, while directors are allowed to consider the 
interests of stakeholders when making decisions on behalf of the corporation 
through constituency statutes and relevant case law, directors are not required to 
consider the interests of stakeholders when making decisions. See Leung, supra note 
27; infra notes 334–40 and accompanying text. For further discussion of duties owed 
to stakeholders, or more accurately the lack of fiduciary duties owed to stakeholders, 
see infra Part V.C. 
  In 
February 2009, it was revealed that government officials 
allegedly told Lewis that they would remove executives and 
directors from Bank of America if the company did not follow 
269 The testimony regarding this issue is conflicting. See supra notes 61–71 and 
accompanying text. Furthermore, the board may have acted to help the American 
economy, an issue that is further addressed in discussing the duty of care. See supra 
notes 65, 276, and accompanying text. 
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through with purchasing Merrill Lynch.270  In response, after 
Lewis reported these discussions to the board, Bank of America 
continued with the transaction without notifying shareholders of 
Merrill Lynch’s $15 billion loss in the fourth quarter of 2008.271  
While the reasons for these actions are unknown, pursuant to 
testimony, the board of directors was pressured into buying 
Merrill Lynch by the government for the benefit of one very large 
“stakeholder”—the United States economy.272
As discussed in Part II, directors owe a duty of loyalty to the 
shareholders of their company.
  Thus, when a 
director makes a decision under pressure from the government, 
while fearing for his or her job to the detriment of the 
shareholders, the director is likely failing to uphold the duty of 
loyalty owed to shareholders by considering the interests of the 
board before the interests of the shareholders. 
273  Directors must act selflessly so 
that the shareholders’ interests, and not the directors’ 
interests―or potential benefits―are their absolute priority.274
2.  The Duty of Due Care and the Bank of America and 
Citigroup Boards 
  If 
Lewis and other directors at Bank of America feared losing their 
jobs when choosing to buy Merrill Lynch, their selected course of 
action likely constituted a violation of their fiduciary duty of 
loyalty to the shareholders. 
Additionally, the boards of directors of Bank of America and 
Citigroup will not be protected by the business judgment rule if 
they violated their duty of due care to shareholders by making an 
“unadvised judgment” through gross negligence.275
 
270 See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6. 
  While many 
due care causes of action for monetary damages have 
disappeared due to exculpatory provisions and the difficulty of 
bringing shareholder derivative suits, the issues here could 
271 See Changing Course, supra note 60. 
272 See infra Part V.C for a discussion of considering stakeholders when making 
a decision on behalf of the corporation and specifically for a discussion about why 
this author does not feel that the United States economy is a legitimate 
“stakeholder.” 
273 See supra text accompanying notes 181–86. 
274 See supra text accompanying notes 181–86. 
275 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. The standard for violating due 
care is acting with gross negligence, and thus an “unadvised judgment” is not just a 
simple mistake. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000). 
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potentially survive a duty of due care cause of action for 
injunctive relief.276  A due care cause of action for injunctive 
relief, but not monetary damages, is potentially still relevant for 
two “unadvised” decisions made with gross negligence: the failure 
to invoke the MAC clause and subsequent purchase of Merrill 
Lynch, and the failure to notify shareholders of the MOU.277  
While the merger and MOU have already occurred, if any 
remaining issues or transactions in conjunction with these two 
problematic decisions exist, they likely would be grounds for 
injunctive relief for breaching the duty of due care.278
Indeed, the board of directors who wanted to enact the MAC 
clause knew it was an appropriate course of action in the 
situation and in the best interest of the corporation to do so, but 
chose to instead complete the purchase of Merrill Lynch allegedly 
at the request of the government.
  
279  Moreover, the board’s 
additional decision to not disclose to shareholders the terms of 
the MOU that it began operating under in May 2009 may be 
viewed as an “unadvised judgment” to withhold material 
information that shareholders should have considered when 
reviewing the terms of the transaction.280
 
276 See supra note 204 and accompanying text (stating that section 102(b)(7) 
allows shareholders to adopt an exculpatory provision protecting directors from 
personal liability for monetary damages for breaching the duty of care). Of course, 
exculpatory provisions do not excuse directors from causes of action for breaches of 
the duties of loyalty or good faith.  
  This set of facts raises 
the issue of a possible breach of the duty of due care. 
277 See supra Part I.A. The board of director’s decision to not disclose the 
financial condition of Merrill Lynch is not relevant under the duty of due care. 
278 For example, if any transactions related to the merger are still pending, such 
as the selling of assets, the transactions could potentially be enjoined. Furthermore, 
any management or board decisions stemming from the MOU that are still pending 
could also potentially be enjoined. 
279 See supra notes 61–71 and accompanying text. 
280 See supra notes 61–71 and accompanying text. While the government is not 
required to disclose the MOU to the public, the board of directors has somewhat of a 
choice regarding whether or not to inform shareholders of this agreement. A Form 8-
K describes the events that trigger a company’s requirement to file a report with the 
SEC that in turn notifies shareholders of key news regarding the company. See 
Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2011). The two relevant provisions of Form 8-K for Bank of 
America’s MOU are Item 1.01, which calls for disclosure when a company enters into 
a “Material Definitive Agreement,” and Item 8.01, which simply discusses “Other 
Events,” or those events “that are not specifically called for by Form 8-K, that the 
registrant considers to be of importance to security holders.” See id. While 
shareholders would argue that an MOU is material, and thus Bank of America’s 
failure to disclose constitutes an unadvised judgment under the duty of due care, 
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Furthermore, Citigroup’s board of directors’ decision to 
remove Kelly as the CFO may be viewed as a breach of the duty 
of due care if it was “unadvised” and may also be grounds for 
injunctive relief, such as enjoining similar management decisions 
in the future.281
If the government or another third party, however, 
influences a board to eject management, whether or not a 
decision was informed and reasoned, the decision appears 
suspicious.  If a decision was made under pressure from the 
government, there may have been an uninformed decision and, 
thus, one not made with due care.  Furthermore, Citigroup’s 
board of directors has a duty to be fair to all shareholders, and 
the government’s role as a shareholder places suspicion on the 
board’s obligation to treat all shareholders fairly.
  If, however, the board’s decision to remove Kelly 
was an informed, reasoned decision, despite the governmental 
pressure that was exerted on the board, it will not be considered 
a breach of the duty of due care.  Boards of directors must act 
independently when making decisions, and if Citigroup’s board 
independently concluded that it was reasonable to remove Kelly, 
then no breach of the duty of due care occurred. 
282
3. The Duty of Good Faith and the Bank of America Board 
  Thus, while 
all the facts may not be known regarding the board’s removal of 
Kelly from management, it is possible that the board breached its 
fiduciary obligations to shareholders by not acting with due care, 
which in turn means it may have also violated its duty to be fair 
to shareholders. 
Furthermore, the board of directors of Bank of America may 
have violated the third prong of the business judgment rule: the 
duty of good faith.283
 
Bank of America would likely claim that because it is an informal procedure, where 
it is unclear what action would be taken for a violation of the MOU, it does not 
trigger a Form 8-K filing obligation. However, because Bank of America’s MOU 
involves corporate governance and Item 5.02 requires filing a Form 8-K when a 
departure or election of officers occurs, once change happens in corporate 
governance, it will be disclosed to shareholders. See id. Thus, while shareholders 
have a case for arguing that failing to disclose the MOU is a breach of the duty of 
due care, Bank of America’s likely arguments for why they chose not to disclose the 
MOU will, in the author’s opinion, win over any potential shareholder arguments. 
  As discussed in Part II, the duty of good 
281 See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text. 
282 See supra Part IV.B. 
283 See Kerr, supra note 167, at 1049–51, for a discussion about whether or not 
the duty of good faith is a stand-alone duty or part of the duty of loyalty. 
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faith requires that directors’ motivations stem from “a true 
faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and 
its shareholders.”284  Moreover, violating the duty of good faith 
often involves a showing of bad faith, which is defined as a 
“fiduciary intentionally fail[ing] to act in the face of a known duty 
to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his [or her] 
duties.”285  Conscious disregard is difficult to prove, and thus 
distinguishes the duty of good faith from the duty of loyalty, 
where a plaintiff only needs to show that a director either was 
conflicted between duty and self-interest or did not demonstrate 
an undivided loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.286  
For example, the board of directors in Lyondell failed to take all 
of the preferred steps before a merger,287 but because they took 
some steps, and thus did not act with conscious disregard, they 
were not found to have violated the duty of good faith.288  The 
Delaware Supreme Court stated that they may have breached 
the duty of due care, but their behavior simply did not equate 
with conscious disregard and a violation of the duty of good 
faith.289
Bank of America’s board of directors failed to disclose 
material information to shareholders that would have corrected a 
previously made statement that was now false.  However, simply 
failing to take action does not automatically mean a director has 
violated the duty of good faith; instead, it must be shown that the 
director consciously chose to avoid a duty.  In the case of Bank of 
America, it is unknown if the directors consciously chose not to 
inform shareholders of Merrill Lynch’s deteriorating financial 
condition because they were considering their own job security or 
the interests of the American economy.  If these considerations 
played a significant role in their actions towards the 
shareholders, and if one considers the duty of good faith to be a 
 
 
284 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); see also In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (“The business judgment 
rule [is not] available to a fiduciary who could be shown to have caused a transaction 
to be effectuated . . . for a reason unrelated to a pursuit of the corporation’s best 
interests.”). 
285 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 
2006). 
286 See Disney I, 907 A.2d at 751. 
287 See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 237 (Del. 2009). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
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separate duty from the duty of loyalty, then they likely violated 
the duty of good faith, even though they may have felt such 
actions were integral to their patriotic duty.  
If the board did not act with conscious disregard in choosing 
to not correct their previously incorrect statement, they likely did 
not violate the duty of good faith.  Nevertheless, their failure to 
disclose material information to shareholders may still raise 
other legal issues, such as the duty of loyalty, duty of candor, and 
Rule 10b-5. 
4. Rule 10b-5 and the Bank of America Board 
The SEC recently settled a lawsuit with Bank of America for 
$150 million for, among other items, failing to disclose to 
shareholders the financial losses of Merrill Lynch.290  Thus, the 
issue of Rule 10b-5 liability between the SEC and Bank of 
America has effectively been settled.  However, this decision does 
not mean that the issue of Rule 10b-5 liability is completely over 
with regard to Bank of America’s lack of disclosure to 
shareholders since Rule 10b-5 may still be pursued by 
individuals in private civil suits.291  As previously discussed, 
Bank of America did not disclose to shareholders (1) the dismal 
financial situation of Merrill Lynch, which Bank of America 
discovered shortly after the December 5, 2008 shareholder vote 
that approved the purchase of Merrill Lynch; and (2) the secret 
MOU agreement.292  Of the ten elements required to prove a 10b-
5 violation,293 the elements that will be of issue in a civil suit are 
whether there was a duty to disclose, whether the information 
was material, and whether the defendants acted with scienter.294  
Because a duty to disclose will arise when an event occurs that 
makes a previous statement inaccurate,295
 
290 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 Bank of America had a 
duty to disclose to shareholders the financial losses at Merrill 
Lynch, as it would have corrected their previous statements 
regarding how it was a good decision to purchase the corporation.  
Furthermore, that information will be considered material, as 
financial information related to a merger is traditionally 
291 See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 517. 
292 See supra Part I.A. 
293 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
295 See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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considered to be material.296  Even though shareholders had 
approved the transaction before the directors learned of the 
complete financial condition of Merrill Lynch, the transaction 
had not yet been finalized and could have been stopped had 
shareholders known.  Also, Bank of America likely had an 
obligation to disclose the secret MOU agreement, as it impacted 
management decisions that shareholders would also likely find 
material.297  The only difficulty in proving both causes of action 
will stem from proving scienter.298  However, as most circuits 
have concluded that recklessness is sufficient to meet the 
scienter element, Bank of America’s failure to disclose Merrill 
Lynch’s financial condition and the existence of an MOU 
agreement will likely amount to a “highly unreasonable 
omission,” thus satisfying the reckless conduct standard.299  
Initially, when Bank of America first made the statements 
concerning Merrill Lynch’s financial condition, the board of 
directors likely could not have been held liable, as it did not know 
that such statements were false.300
 
296 A material fact has been defined by the Supreme Court as one that if 
omitted, “a substantial likelihood [exists] that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important in deciding how to vote.” TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (stating that “a reasonable stockholder would want to know an important 
economic motivation of the negotiator singularly employed by a board to obtain the 
best price for the stockholders”); Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 532 (Del. Ch. 
2000) (stating that financial details withheld during a merger were material and the 
board “defaulted on its affirmative obligation to disclose the information” to 
shareholders).  
  Conversely, after Bank of 
297 The MOU called for Bank of America to overhaul its management, and six 
directors promptly resigned between May 26 and June 17, 2009. See U.S. Regulators 
to BofA, supra note 82. On June 5, 2009, Bank of America announced that it had 
elected four new directors to its board. Press Release, Bank of America, Four New 
Directors Elected to Bank of America Board (June 5, 2009), available at 
http://mediaroom.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=234503&p=irol-newsArticle& 
ID=1390236&highlight=. On August 21, 2009, Bank of America announced the 
election of the fifth new director to the board. See Press Release, Bank of America, 
Bank of America Board Elects Scully as New Director (Aug. 21, 2009), available at 
http://mediaroom.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=234503&p=irol-newsArticle& 
ID=1390269&highlight=. Finally, on September 21, 2009, Bank of America 
announced the election of the sixth new director to the board. See Press Release, 
Bank of America, Bank of America Board Elects Holliday as New Director (Sept. 21, 
2009), available at http://mediaroom.bankofamerica.com/ phoenix.zhtml?c=234503& 
p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1390283&highlight=. 
298 See supra notes 237–41 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text. 
300 See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6. 
CP_Kerr (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:17 PM 
2011] THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN OF 2008 103 
America’s management discovered the truth as to Merrill Lynch’s 
poor finances, the board of directors’ decision to remain silent on 
the issue and to enter into a secret MOU may likely qualify as 
reckless conduct.301
5. The Duty of Candor and the Bank of America Board 
  Accordingly, if a plaintiff is able to fulfill the 
scienter requirement, he or she will likely succeed in proving the 
remaining elements of Rule 10b-5 against Bank of America. 
Similar to Rule 10b-5, the duty of candor in Delaware 
imposes a fiduciary duty on directors to disclose all material 
information to shareholders in situations requiring shareholders’ 
approval or votes or when willfully communicating to 
shareholders or the public about the corporation.302  Here, Bank 
of America had already communicated to shareholders and 
gained their approval in early December 2008 about the Merrill 
Lynch transaction.  However, by mid-December 2008, Merrill 
Lynch’s financials were not what had been represented to 
shareholders and the transaction was finalized weeks before 
shareholders ever learned of Merrill Lynch’s losses and of Bank 
of America’s subsequent governmental loan to finalize the 
transaction.303
While the board of Bank of America may not have violated 
the duty of candor, or any other fiduciary duties, when it first 
requested shareholders to vote on the proposed merger—
although allegations made by Cuomo may indicate otherwise
   
304—
the board could have violated the duty of candor once it learned 
that its previous statements concerning Merrill Lynch’s financial 
condition were false.  According to Malone v. Brincat, if directors 
are not seeking shareholder action, “but are deliberately 
misinforming shareholders about the business of the corporation, 
either directly or by a public statement, there is a violation of 
fiduciary duty,”305
 
301 See supra notes 51–56, 81, and accompanying text. 
 as directors of corporations have a “fiduciary 
duty to shareholders to exercise due care, good faith[,] and 
loyalty” when communicating to the public or to shareholders 
302 See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
303 See supra Part I.A. 
304 See Cuomo Letter, supra note 39, at 2. Cuomo alleged that some of Merrill 
Lynch’s substantial losses “had become known to Bank of America executives prior 
to the merger vote.” Id. 
305 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998). 
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regarding the business of the corporation.306  Moreover, this “duty 
to disclose fully and fairly all material information within the 
board’s control when it seeks shareholder action” applies not only 
to proxy statements, but also to “any other disclosures in 
contemplation of stockholder action.”307
Once the board of Bank of America learned in mid-December 
2008 that the statements made to shareholders before the vote 
were incorrect, the board should have disclosed these material 
findings before the merger was finalized on January 1, 2009.
  In essence, Malone failed 
to address the situation of an omission by directors where no 
shareholder action is being sought, leaving questions 
unanswered as to what qualifies as “shareholder action.”  
308  
Although “shareholder action” is generally defined in connection 
with a request for shareholder vote or approval, because the 
directors of Bank of America could have solicited a new vote after 
informing shareholders of Merrill Lynch’s losses, shareholder 
action arguably could still have been sought in this context before 
the merger was officially finalized.309  Furthermore, in the 
unlikely event that a second vote could not have occurred, 
shareholders could still have sought an injunction to prevent the 
merger from going forward.  In essence, when further 
shareholder action—in the form of a revote or an injunction—
could be taken in response to new material information that 
must be disclosed to correct previously made false statements, 
the duty of candor should encompass the directors’ decision to 
omit such disclosure.  Accordingly, under this standard, Bank of 
America’s failure to disclose the material information concerning 
Merrill Lynch’s financial condition constitutes a violation of the 
duty of candor.310
 
306 Id. at 10. 
 
307 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 710 (Del. 2009) (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 
606 A.2d 75, 84–85 (Del. 1992)). 
308 While the merger had closed on January 1, 2009, a merger is not truly 
finalized until the transaction is consummated. 
309 In this context, the board of Bank of America could have issued a revised 
proxy informing the shareholders of Merrill Lynch’s substantial losses and seeking a 
second vote to approve the merger. As such, the directors would be in compliance 
with the duty of candor’s requirement “to disclose fully and fairly all material 
information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action.” See 
Gantler, 965 A.2d at 710 (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992)). 
310 If shareholders have an interest in pursuing a lawsuit against the 
government for pressuring the board of Bank of America into this decision, it may be 
feasible. See infra note 329. 
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B. Potential Conflicts and Legal Issues Arising from the 
Government’s Role as Shareholder and Regulator 
As previously discussed, the government also serves as a 
shareholder in many corporations, including GM and Citigroup.  
As both a majority and controlling shareholder in these 
corporations, respectively, the government may have already 
violated its duties to fellow shareholders or is in a situation 
where it could potentially violate its duties to fellow 
shareholders. 
1. GM and the Government as a Shareholder and Regulator 
First, the government is clearly the majority shareholder of 
GM since it owns sixty percent of the company.311  The White 
House released a statement detailing its plans as a “reluctant 
shareholder,”312 and hopefully the government will act in such a 
way.  As of the writing of this Article, the government has only 
appointed five members to the thirteen-person board,313 and is 
therefore complying with the Delaware corporate voting laws.314  
However, unlike controlling shareholders, who do not owe 
fiduciary duties to other shareholders unless the other 
shareholders prove domination or control,315 majority 
shareholders have the ability to control the corporation and 
therefore owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders.316
 
311 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
  The 
government cannot state that it is a “reluctant shareholder” and 
avoid the duties it owes to the shareholders as a majority 
shareholder, while also attempting to control GM in a number of 
ways.  What is not clear is what happens when the government, 
as a regulator, pressures the board of directors, conveniently 
side-stepping its role as a shareholder.  While the government 
may hold the power to influence some issues as a regulator, when 
does it cross the line as a shareholder?  Specifically, when do its 
312 See supra note 117. 
313 See supra notes 108, 112. 
314 According to Delaware General Corporation Law section 212(a), unless 
otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, each stockholder in a Delaware 
corporation is entitled to one vote for each share of capital stock they hold. DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2010). 
315 See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text. 
316 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994) 
(citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 
1987)). 
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roles as regulator and shareholder conflict, harming other 
shareholders as a consequence?  The unclear, conflicting nature 
of the government’s dual role as majority shareholder and 
regulator is likely to be problematic in the future. 
However, potential conflicts and breaches of the 
government’s fiduciary duty to fellow shareholders exist 
currently.  The government, which is pushing aggressive new 
fuel-economy and emissions targets, will not only be GM’s largest 
shareholder, but also its chief regulator of vehicle fuel-efficiency 
standards.317  As GM is known for making large, fuel-inefficient 
vehicles, this situation could become problematic if the 
government forces GM—either through regulations or by simply 
directly telling it to do so—to manufacture cars that the 
government, and not GM, wants to manufacture.318  Also, fears 
have developed that if the government initially pushes new fuel-
standards―or safety standards or any other standard on 
cars―and the Office of Management and Budget realizes that 
the standards will be too costly for GM, and in turn the 
government, the standards will be eliminated.319
In fact, Congress has already exerted its power over GM’s 
affairs.  Once out of bankruptcy, GM planned to expand its 
imports of cars made at GM factories in China.  But after 
pressure from Congress, GM agreed to reopen an American 
factory to build smaller models that are not currently produced in 
the United States.
  While the 
government may be GM’s regulator, it is also its majority 
shareholder, and thus any action it takes with the company must 
involve fulfilling its fiduciary duty to fellow shareholders. 
320  While keeping the factory in the United 
States may be best for local workers, it may have been in the best 
interests of GM to move the plant to China.321
 
317 King et al., supra note 118. 
 
318 See id. Some of GM’s most profitable cars are the Chevy Silverado and 
Cadillac Escalade, both of which require a significant amount of fuel. See id. 
President Obama recently signed new fuel-economy and emissions targets. See id. 
Meeting these goals, but maintaining the vehicles that provide a profit to GM, may 
be a problem for the government when it is also a shareholder. See id. 
319 Id. 
320 See id. GM decided to open this factory in the United States during its 
negotiations with the UAW. See id. 
321 See id. John Casesa, a Wall Street analyst, stated, “The government has 
conflicting policy objectives now . . . [that will] create substantial risk to the 
government earning a good return on its investment.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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2. Citigroup and the Government as Shareholder and 
Regulator 
While the government is clearly the majority, and thus 
controlling, shareholder of GM, the situation for Citigroup is not 
so clear.  On July 30, 2009, the government officially became the 
owner of thirty-four percent of Citigroup, twenty-seven percent 
being held as common stock and the rest as preferred 
securities.322  Thus, the government comprises the largest block 
of shareholders.323  Although thirty-four percent is well under the 
fifty percent threshold for being considered the majority 
shareholder,324 shareholders who own less than fifty percent of 
the corporation can still be considered controlling shareholders, 
depending upon how much control and dominion they exercise 
over the corporation.325
The government’s behavior indicates that it has exercised 
enough domination and control over Citigroup’s board of 
directors to qualify as a controlling shareholder, despite owning 
less than a majority of the corporation, based on the definitions 
discussed above.
 
326  Moreover, no other shareholder owns more 
shares than the government, so the government is easily able to 
continue exercising dominion and control over the corporation if 
it wishes to do so.  Currently, the government is successfully 
attempting to influence how Citigroup’s board manages the 
company, despite owning less than the majority of the 
corporation.  First, Citigroup spun-off Smith Barney into a joint 
venture with Morgan Stanley at the request of federal 
regulators.327
 
322 See supra notes 130, 133, and accompanying text. 
  Next, the FDIC pressured Citigroup to restructure 
its management, even going so far as allegedly threatening to 
lower the government’s confidential ranking of Citigroup if the 
company refused to remove Pandit and others from 
323 See Citigroup Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 19 (Feb. 
26, 2010). 
324 Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 256, at 1269 (“ [A] shareholder who owns more 
than 50% of the company’s outstanding shares has become the archetypal 
‘controlling’ shareholder.”). 
325 See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text; see also In re Caplan, 20 
A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep’t), aff’d, 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964) (explaining that a shareholder who owns a small percentage in 
the company can still qualify as a controlling shareholder based on his or her actions 
as a shareholder). 
326 See supra Part IV.C. 
327 Paletta & Enrich, supra note 138. 
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management.328
 Thus, the government’s involvement in these corporations 
will be interesting to watch, as it certainly can be considered a 
majority shareholder of GM and is most likely a controlling 
shareholder of Citigroup.  The government’s possible role as a 
controlling shareholder means that it must exercise caution in its 
dealings with Citigroup to ensure that it complies with the 
fiduciary duties owed to its fellow Citigroup shareholders.
  Accordingly, even though the government only 
owns thirty-four percent of Citigroup, it has loaned so much 
money to Citigroup through the TARP program that it can 
technically still strongly influence the board of directors.  
Moreover, similar to the situation with GM, the government also 
serves as the regulator of Citigroup.  
329
C. Expanding the Definition of a Stakeholder:  Can Boards of 
Directors Consider the United States Public a Stakeholder? 
 
One of the justifications given for Bank of America’s 
purchase of Merrill Lynch, and for its failure to disclose its true 
financial state, was that following through with the purchase 
was for the overall good of the American economy.330
 
328 See id. 
  The 
329 In the event that the government breaches the duties owed to other 
shareholders in Citigroup, and those shareholders decide to sue, those shareholders 
will be in a unique situation, as they would be suing the government. However, 
absent an express statutory waiver, the theory of sovereign immunity shields the 
federal government and its agencies from suit. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988)). Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the government’s sovereign immunity is 
waived for actions that seek injunctive relief. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the 
United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim 
that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an 
official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor 
relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States 
or that the United States is an indispensable party. 
 Id. Furthermore, Congress has waived this immunity for a wide range of suits, 
including suits that seek money damages. Dep’t of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 
255, 260 (1999).  
330 Crittenden & Hilsenrath, supra note 70. In Bernanke’s Capitol Hill 
testimony, he stated the decision to buy Merrill Lynch was “taken under highly 
unusual circumstances in the face of grave threats to our financial system and our 
economy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, in Lewis’s Capitol 
Hill testimony, he stated that he was told by Bernanke and Paulson that the merger 
needed to be finalized, or else it would “impose a big risk to the financial system” of 
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altruistic notions of the government forcing boards of directors to 
consider the health of the national economy, however impressive, 
do not agree with corporate law principals.  Traditionally, 
directors could only consider the interests of shareholders when 
making such decisions;331 recently, however, corporations have 
increasingly considered stakeholders’ interests.332  As early as the 
1960s, an Illinois court stated that “the effect on the surrounding 
neighborhood might well be considered by a director,”333 and the 
Delaware Supreme Court has held that directors may consider 
stakeholders’ interests when making decisions.334  Boards of 
directors have the right to consider stakeholder interests under 
constituency statutes and are also seeking direct approval from 
stockholders to do so.335  The consistency statutes generally 
allow, but do not mandate, officers and directors of corporations 
to consider stakeholders’ interests when making decisions on 
behalf of the company.336
 
the entire United States. Rappaport, supra note 47 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Paulson told Lewis that “the U.S. government was committed to ensuring 
that no systemically important financial institution would fail.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
  Those stakeholders generally consist of 
331 See Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the 
Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 989, 1023 (1993) (“The traditional common law 
rule was that, absent proof of a benefit to shareholders, disbursements on behalf of 
nonshareholder constituencies were ultra vires.”). 
332 See Alissa Mickels, Note, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling 
the Ideals of a For-Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. 
and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271, 272 (2009). 
333 Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
334 The Delaware Supreme Court has considered directors’ obligations to 
shareholders’ interests in four cases, all of which arose in the context of a takeover. 
See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) 
(reiterating shareholder primacy); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 
1140 (Del. 1990) (allowing the directors to merge with a company when a better 
price was offered by another company in order to preserve the company’s culture, 
allowing for consideration other than that of the shareholders); Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (“[W]hile 
concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a takeover 
threat, that principle is limited by the requirement that there be some rationally 
related benefit accruing to the stockholders.”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that, in situations involving control of the 
corporation, directors are allowed to consider the interests of stakeholders). 
Essentially, taken together, these cases state that shareholders come first, unless 
special circumstances exist. 
335 Mickels, supra note 332, at 290. 
336 See Kathleen Hale, Note, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond 
Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 829 (2003). The specifics of stakeholder 
statutes vary from state to state, with some states only applying them to directors, 
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employees, suppliers, creditors, and the local community where 
the business is located.337  However, Delaware has not enacted a 
constituency statute,338 and thus considering stakeholders’ 
interests in Delaware is governed by case law, which permits, but 
does not require, the consideration of stakeholders.339  It follows 
that courts will allow directors―and sometimes officers―to 
consider stakeholders when making decisions, but directors and 
officers do not owe specific fiduciary duties to stakeholders; 
instead, they owe fiduciary duties to the corporation.340  
Considering stakeholders’ interests, in addition to those of the 
shareholders, derives from the concept of corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”).341  Considering stakeholders’ interests, or 
being “socially responsible,” can also lead to larger profits, and 
thus is one of the many reasons why corporations are encouraged 
to engage in CSR.342
Thus, it may appear that Bank of America’s and the 
government’s decision to follow through with the purchase of 
Merrill Lynch for the sake of the United States economy was 
based on the interests of a major stakeholder, the American 
public.  However, including the American public as a stakeholder 
goes far beyond what is typically considered a stakeholder—
 
 
some states only applying them to certain circumstances, and other states only 
addressing the specific interests they are allowed to consider. See id. at 833–36. 
“Connecticut is the only state that requires directors and executives to consider 
stakeholders’ interests.” Id. at 834. The statutes were enacted “to provide corporate 
leaders with a mechanism for considering stakeholder interests without breaching 
their fiduciary obligations to shareholders.” Id. at 832. 
337 See Mickels, supra note 332, at 292. 
338 See Hale, supra note 336, at 833. 
339 See supra note 334. 
340 See Bernard S. Sharfman, Enhancing The Efficiency of Board Decision 
Making: Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis of 2008, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 813, 
829 (2009). 
341 See Colin Marks & Nancy B. Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer’s Role in a 
Contemporary Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1273, 1280 (2009) (defining 
CSR as a “business’s responsibility to the wider societal good beyond, but in addition 
to, the business’s economic performance”). There are four pillars to CSR: economic 
responsibilities, legal responsibilities, ethical responsibilities, and discretionary or 
philanthropic responsibilities. Id. at 1273. Discretionary or philanthropic 
responsibilities include contributing to “various kinds of social, educational, 
recreational, or cultural purposes.” Id. at 1274 (quoting Dirk Matten & Andrew 
Crane, Corporate Citizenship: Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 
30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 166, 167 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
342 See Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate 
Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 835 (2008). 
CP_Kerr (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2011  4:17 PM 
2011] THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN OF 2008 111 
generally, the local community.343  Even if it is argued that the 
United States is the community to which Bank of America 
belongs, it is this author’s opinion that this community is far too 
large to be considered a traditional stakeholder.  Bank of 
America’s decisions cannot be justified through the umbrella of 
CSR, as the directors and officers owe fiduciary duties first to the 
corporation.  The board may consider stakeholders under CSR, 
but only those groups whose interests are impacted by the 
corporation—employees, creditors, suppliers, and the local 
community.344
D. Golden Shares: The Future of Government Interaction in the 
Private Sector in the United States? 
  The consideration of stakeholders cannot possibly 
extend to the entire economic health of the nation.  Therefore, 
the justification for not enacting the MAC clause or for not 
disclosing to shareholders the financial health of Merrill Lynch 
for the benefit of the American economy does not have any merit 
under any corporate law theories or doctrines. 
In addition to analyzing the current blurry legal lines of 
governmental interaction in the private sector, it is important to 
reflect on what may become a trend in government regulation 
and ownership of American corporations if the government 
divests its interests in the companies discussed.  If the United 
States government opts to divest its interests in private 
companies but retain ownership and control, the United States 
will be engaging in a concept similar to that used by foreign 
governments to protect national security interests.345  Through 
the concept known as “golden shares,” many foreign governments 
retain influence in corporations without actually owning a single 
share.346  The golden share attaches special rights to the 
government, allowing the government to veto or approve 
company decisions.347
 
343 See Mickels, supra note 332, at 292. 
  Thus, the government can exercise control 
344 See id. 
345 See Marcelo Moscogliato, Foreign Direct Investment in Corporations: 
Restrictions in the United States and Brazil on the Grounds of National Defense, 9 
OR. REV. INT’L L. 67, 102 (2007). 
346 See Christine O’Grady Putek, Comment, Limited But Not Lost: A Comment 
on the ECJ’s Golden Share Decisions, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2219, 2220 n.4 (2004). 
347 See id. The United Kingdom first started utilizing golden shares in 
corporations in the 1980s, specifically “as a means of protecting its sovereignty and 
national security.” Christopher M. Weimer, Note, Foreign Direct Investment and 
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over certain companies, which can in turn represent entire 
sectors of the economy, despite the fact that the companies are 
private.348  Some governments, including those of Brazil and the 
United Kingdom, claim that national defense needs justify 
creating golden shares, as golden shares can encourage economic 
privatization while at the same time allowing governments to 
have a say in key defense corporations.349
The most obvious comparison to an American golden share is 
the government’s current ownership stake in many corporations 
discussed in this Article.  While beginning the process of 
divesting some of its substantive interests in companies, the 
government has also begun to increase its regulatory power—a 
move that further enables the government to exert influence and 
control over corporations.  One example of such activity is the 
government’s decision to appoint a pay czar, Kenneth 
Feinberg.
 
350  Feinberg announced in October 2009 that the 
salaries for 175 employees at companies receiving government 
aid will be cut, with the majority being lowered to under 
$500,000.351  Additionally, the annualized total pay level of the 
impacted companies will be fifty percent less than in the previous 
year.352  Those companies include Bank of America, Citigroup, 
and GM.353  While cash salaries will be reduced, employees will 
still receive salary in stock that cannot be accessed for at least 
four years.354
 
National Security Post-FINSA 2007, 87 TEX. L. REV. 663, 678 (2009). It began with 
the privatization process of firms owned by the government, with the government 
only retaining specific rights. See id. at 679. For example, some golden share 
provisions include “the requirement that the British government sign off on any sale 
of Rolls-Royce’s nuclear operations, the requirement that the [British] government 
accede to any purchase of more than a fifteen-percent stake in British Energy, and 
the capability to oversee business decisions in the firms comprising the system of 
Royal Dockyards.” Id. at 678. 
  Owning shares in these corporations and 
348 See Moscogliato, supra note 345, at 99, 101. 
349 See id. at 102. 
350 See Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Pay Slashed at Bailout Firms, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2009, at A1. The Treasury Department created a “pay czar” 
after the drama surrounding the bonus payments at AIG in March 2009. Id. 
351 Id. 
352 Aaron Luchetti et al., Fed Hits Banks with Sweeping Pay Limits, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 23, 2009, at A1. 
353 Solomon & Fitzpatrick, supra note 350. AIG, GMAC, Chrysler Group LLC, 
and Chrysler Financial have also been affected by the pay czar’s actions. Id. 
354 See id. The Obama Administration had Feinberg connect compensation to 
long-term performance in order to stop “employees from taking unnecessary risks for 
short-term gains.” Id. 
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maintaining control over the salaries at these corporations, 
among the other regulatory powers already conferred upon the 
government, provides the government with unprecedented access 
to and control over corporations.  The government has the right 
to regulate corporations; however, there is a point when 
regulation will exceed its acceptable limit, and that time may 
have come.  Moreover, it is as if the government is setting up the 
mechanisms and regulations now to control corporations in the 
future once its interest as either a creditor or shareholder has 
been divested.  Thus, the stage is being set for the concept of 
golden shares to be exercised in the United States. 
Of course, in other countries the justification for golden 
shares is protecting a nation’s national security interests.  
Protecting a nation’s economic health may be just as important 
as protecting the nation’s security interests.  However, the ability 
to protect the security of a nation through the issuance of golden 
shares is fairly limited, as only a small number of corporations 
engage in this sector of the economy.  On the other hand, the 
number of corporations whose success is vital to the economic 
health of the nation is enormous; in fact, almost every major 
corporation could be considered to be vital to the economic health 
of the economy.  Is allowing the government to have a voice in 
every corporation’s decisionmaking process essential to the 
health of the American economy?  Has the time come when the 
economic health of the nation is a national security issue?  If the 
government’s influence in Bank of America’s purchase of Merrill 
Lynch and partial ownership of GM and Citigroup is justifiable 
on these grounds, what is next?  It may only be a few 
corporations now, but it could potentially be the beginning of 
strong governmental influence in corporate boardrooms across 
the country and the subsequent rewriting of American corporate 
law.  While the government is not technically issuing golden 
shares, its behavior appears to mark the beginning of what may 
become the issuance of golden shares in America. 
CONCLUSION 
Although one often assumes that the government and the 
private sector should not become intertwined, during desperate 
times it can arguably be a welcomed source of quick relief.  
Certainly, it was, for the most part, well-received during the 
Great Depression when approximately fifteen million people 
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were out of work and the government developed many programs 
in the hopes of creating jobs and stimulating the economy.355
Indeed, the government’s intervention may have clearly 
wiped away boards of directors’ protection under the business 
judgment rule and may have exposed them to liability under the 
triad of traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care, and good 
faith, as well as the duty of candor, the duty to be fair, and Rule 
10b-5.  Additionally, the government’s new role as a majority or 
controlling shareholder and creditor has raised many vital 
questions about the fiduciary duties the government owes 
shareholders when it serves as both a corporation’s chief 
regulator and majority or controlling shareholder.  Even if the 
government’s actions in these three corporations prove to be 
effective, this behavior may not be effective in future situations.  
Furthermore, the government’s current behavior may be setting 
the stage for the practice of golden shares in the United States, 
which would dramatically change the way in which the 
government interacts with corporations.  Thus, it is important to 
evaluate the current situation not only to ensure that if corporate 
laws were violated in 2008 and 2009 that they will not be 
violated in the future, but also to monitor what may be the 
beginning of a dramatic change in government ownership and 
the regulation of American corporations. 
  
However, in the case of the corporations discussed in this 
Article—Bank of America, GM, and Citigroup—only time will tell 
if the government’s intervention was not only necessary to their 
survival, but also crucial to the survival of the American 
economy.  Even if the government’s intervention in the private 
sector was necessary, one should not wait to explore what is 
already apparent:  The government’s intervention has 
significantly blurred American corporate laws. 
 
 
355 See ZINN, supra note 1, at 386–87, 392–93. 
